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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1922, the Supreme Court embarked on its first decision to pro-
tect property owners from unbridled, uncompensated government regu-
lation.1 Prior to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the courts applied
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendments only to "'di-
rect appropriation[s]' of property ... or the functional equivalent of a
'practical ouster of [the owner's] possession.' "4 Mahon established that
governmental regulation that affects an owner's use of his land may
constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. In Mahon, Justice
Holmes recognized the need for constitutional limits on the govern-
ment's power to impair certain rights inherent in the ownership of
property, especially when abolishing those rights has the same effect as
appropriating or destroying the property itself.5 Justice Holmes under-
stood that human nature gradually would lead government officials to
qualify the rights of ownership under the guise of police power until, at
last, private property disappeared.' Without a check on their powers,
officials may use regulation as an off-the-books method in lieu of taxa-
tion and compensation to achieve certain goals, particularly when funds
are unavailable or when it appears that taxpayers will not support such
a use of available funds. This abuse of the police power, Justice Holmes
observed, amounts to "petty larceny."7 The Just Compensation Clause
1. Pennsylannia Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In the eyes of many current Jus-
tices, Mahon remains the cornerstone for regulatory takings jurisprudence. Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Powell,
J., O'Conner, J., and Scalia, J.). At least one commentator views the case as the "Everest" of
takings law. Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 156 (Yale U., 1977).
2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
3. The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that private property may
not be taken for public use without just compensation. U.S. Const., Amend. V. Although the Four-
teenth Amendment does not include the requirement of just compensation, this limitation is ap-
plied to the states through due process requirements. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
4. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892 (1992) (citations omitted).
The regulatory takings issue did not arise before 1922 because nuisance law dealt with most land
use conflicts on a post hoc basis. During the twentieth century, population pressures and intensive
land use gave rise to the need to prevent foreseeable conflicts on an ad hoc basis through the use of
regulations and the review of regulatory commissions' decisions. For an analysis of this general
development, see Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Ju-
risprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 Tenn. L. Rev. 577 (1990).
5. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414-15 (stating- "For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in
the right to mine it .... What makes the right ... valuable is that it can be exercised with profit.
To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriation or destroying it.").
6. Id. at 415.
7. Neal S. Manne, Note, Reexamining the Supreme Court's View of the Taking Clause, 58
Tex. L. Rev. 1447, 1451 (1980) (citing 1 Holmes-Laski Letters 456-57 (M. Howe ed. 1953)).
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of the Fifth Amendment provided the protection necessary to check
this natural Hobbesian tendency.'
After more than seventy years, the Supreme Court continues to
wander in its self-imposed maze when determining at what point gov-
ernment regulation of land use constitutes a compensable taking. The
language of the takings clause poses three principal issues:9 (1) what
"property" is protected; (2) what acts constitute a "taking;' 0 and (3)
what forms of compensation are "just." Although the text appears to
present a straightforward analytical framework, the Court has created a
labyrinth of "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" and avoided any "set
formula."'" Without a set formula, Supreme Court opinions reveal an
admitted array of inconsistent and arbitrary results.'2 The absence of
an intelligible guideline therefore presents a quagmire of uncertainty.
for real estate developers, municipal planners, environmental commis-
sions, and courts alike. Although land use regulations expanded with
8. For an examination of the philosophical underpinnings of the Fifth Amendment, see
Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Harvard U.,
1985). For notable historical reviews of the takings jurisprudence, see James W. Ely, Jr., The
Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights (Oxford U., 1992);
James W. Ely, Jr., "That due satisfaction may be made:" the Fifth Amendment and the Origins
of the Compensation Principle, 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1 (1992).
9. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945) (stating: "The criti-
cal terms are 'property,' 'taken,' and 'just compensation.' "). The Court has dismissed other possi-
ble issues as merely academic, including whether the phrase "for public use" requires the removal
of property to the public domain for a taking to occur. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 243-44 (1984).
10. The Court does not limit the term "taken" to direct appropriations of title and posses-
sion, or the functional equivalents of a practical ouster of the owner's possession. Lucas, 112 S. Cd
at 2892-93. Instead, the Court focuses on the "deprivation of the former owner rather than the
accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign." General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 378. The
essence of a takings claim is not the extinction of private property, but rather the failure to tender
fair compensation therefor. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County,
482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987).
11. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (citation omitted); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).
12. Both courts and commentators acknowledge this open secret. Even the Supreme Court
itself uncharacteristically admitted its own inconsistency. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7 (acknowl-
edging that the "uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in our 'deprivation'
fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court") (comparing Pennsylania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (holding that a statute restricting subsurface mining of coal
effected a taking) with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-502
(1987) (finding no taking under substantially the same law)). See also Mid Gulf, Inc. v. Bishop, 792
F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (D. Kan. 1992) (stating that "this entire area of the law is somewhat murky
.... "). For commentators' colorful descriptions, see John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the
Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 Rutgers L. Rev. 243, 244
(1982) (calling the cases "a farrago of fumblings which have suffered too long from a surfeit of
deficient theories"); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Mud-
dle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 561 (1984) (stating that takings analysis is currently "a muddle");
Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36, 37 (1964) (deeming the cases "a
welter of confusing and apparently incompatible results").
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few checks by the Court after Mahon, recent Supreme Court opinions
indicate that the Court no longer will extend the boundaries of its judi-
cial deference."3 Nevertheless, the Court still equivocates on what
formula it should apply to takings cases and leaves unresolved the ex-
tent to which an owner's property is constitutionally protected.
Justice Holmes posited that whether government regulation of land
amounts to a taking is a question of degree. 14 When a regulation "goes
too far," he opined in Mahon, the Court should recognize it as a tak-
ing. 5 The diminution in value of the affected property, therefore, pro-
vides one relevant factor to determine whether a regulation goes too far.
This analysis forms what is now commonly referred to as the "diminu-
tion in value test." Under this test, the Court compares the diminution
in value of the property (the numerator) to the value of the whole prop-
erty uncompensated after regulation (the denominator). 6 When a regu-
lation diminishes the value or use of an owner's property "too much," it
constitutes a taking and requires just compensation.' 7 The 1992 Su-
preme Court opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council'8
demonstrates the current vitality of Justice Holmes' original test.19
Moreover, Lucas arguably gives the test even greater force. Under Lu-
cas, a taking occurs whenever a regulatory act deprives an owner of all
economically viable use of his property regardless of other factors un-
less the restricted use constitutes a nuisance under state common law. 0
Nevertheless, Lucas will add nothing to the test's certainty until
the Court defines the most crucial element of the test: the unit of rele-
vant "property" that constitutes the denominator in the "deprivation
13. Lucas establishes that the government cannot deprive a landowner of all economically
viable uses of his land, unless the proscribed use is already unlawful under the state's property and
nuisance common law. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02. The Lucas rule is beneficial because it pre-
vents the state from continually redefining and narrowing a landowner's rights of ownership. The
categorical rule, however, may be criticized for being static because it potentially limits regulation
to a state's traditional common law. Government cannot enforce new laws without compensating
an owner. Moreover, the rule may provide unexpected protection of interests for owners who are
accustomed to and accepting of the modern regulatory state. Whether contemporary regulations
exceed their practical needs and efficient use is obviously a matter of great debate.
14. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
15. Id. (stating that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking").
16. See note 180 and accompanying text.
17. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
18. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
19. Id. at 2894 n.7 (leaving the door open for expansion of the diminution test).
20. Id. at 2895-902. Although courts should adhere to this test without reference to other
tests, the ambiguity concerning the definition of property gives courts the opportunity to dodge
this requirement and move on to a balancing test. See notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
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fraction."21 How much of what is affected? 22 What is "property" for the
purpose of Fifth Amendment analysis? Without a clear definition of the
relevant property, the diminution in value test will continue to produce
an obfuscation of contradictory results.
This Note discusses the history and ramifications of the Court's
failure to define Fifth Amendment "property" for regulatory takings of
real property under the diminution in value test.23 This Note observes
that a broad charting of the denominator of "property" in the diminu-
tion in value test renders the original purpose of the test impotent. Part
II traces the development of balancing tests that have resulted from the
Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with the diminution in value test. In
addition, Part II presents a background of Supreme Court analysis and
opinions regarding the diminution in value test. Part III examines both
the problems of defining a common denominator and the benefits of
providing a clear definition. Part III also analyzes the potential effect of
a clear and narrow definition of the relevant property on the diminu-
tion in value test, especially when considering the larger analytical
framework of takings jurisprudence. Part IV delineates potential real
property interests that could serve as independent denominators and
examines whether categorical takings treatment of such interests would
impose an undue burden on government. This Note concludes that the
diminution in value test, as a per se taking category for the destruction
of narrow real property interests, can provide greater certainty to this
area of the law without imposing an undue burden on government.
II. REGULATORY TAKINGS ANALYSIS AND THE DIMINUTION IN VALUE
TEST
A. Background of Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Analysis
After numerous cases that granted the utmost deference towards
government land use regulations, the Supreme Court in Nollan v. Cali-
21. Id. at 2894 n.7; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497. See also Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent
and Resurrection, 1987 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1987); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
1165, 1192, 1232-33 (1967).
22. See Rose, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 566 (cited in note 12).
23. This Note does not address the issue of regulations of personal property. The Court dis-
tinguishes between real property and personal property interests because of the different expecta-
tions and historical understandings that apply to each. The "notion ... that title [to real property]
is somehow held subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may subsequently eliminate all
economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings
Clause .... ." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. By contrast, "[in the case of personal property .... [the
owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his property
economically worthless .... ." Id. at 2899.
1993] 1287
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fornia Coastal Commission2 4 promulgated a heightened means scrutiny
requirement, requiring land use regulation to "substantially advance" a
legitimate state interest. Although this approach appears to benefit
owners, the test generally influences the result of a case only when land
use regulations require exactions from owners in return for permission
to use their land. This threshold test nevertheless indicates the Court's
concern with the scope of land use regulations.
The Supreme Court currently recognizes two principal categories of
regulatory action that result in per se compensable takings of land."5
Per se compensable takings do not require a balancing of interests or
fact-specific inquiries into the nature of the public interest advanced by
the regulatory action. The first category consists of compelled physical
takings, which occur when a regulation requires a property owner to
suffer a permanent physical "invasion" by the government or a third
party. The Court generally requires compensation in such cases regard-
less of the minuteness of the intrusion or the significance of the public
purpose behind the regulatory action. For example, in Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,26 a statute required landlords to
permit cable television companies to install cable wires and a wiring
box in their apartment buildings. The Court held that the regulation
constituted a taking, even though the wire and box occupied no more
than one and a half cubic feet of the property.
27
In the 1992 case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the
Supreme Court highlighted a second category of per se takings: when a
regulatory action deprives owners of all economically beneficial or pro-
ductive use of their land.2 The category does not apply, however, if the
proscribed use is a nuisance under state common law because no prop-
erty right exists to create a nuisance.19 This rule comports with both
Justice Holmes' opinion in Mahon"° and the landowner's perspective
that a total deprivation of value amounts to the practical equivalent of
24. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
25. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
26. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
27. Id. at 435-40.
28. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981); and Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
29. Determining whether the proscribed use is a nuisance under state common law also pro-
vides the government and Court with another tool to avoid compensation. It stands in a threshold
position before the categorical viable use test. This issue should receive considerable attention
from scholars in the near future. See note 205 and accompanying text for further discussion.
30. See note 15.
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physical appropriation.31 The rule also follows a traditional legal under-
standing of property ownership, which assumes land is owned for eco-
nomic benefit.
3 2
In addition, general judicial assumptions and presumptions do not
apply when government regulation denies all economically beneficial
use of the land. For example, the Court usually assumes that govern-
ment regulation of land use merely" 'adjust[s] the benefits and burdens
of economic life,' ,,ss and that the burdened owner benefits from an "av-
erage reciprocity of advantage 3 4 of similar burdens on other proper-
ties."5 This assumption is less likely, if not impossible, however, when
an owner suffers a complete deprivation of value. Reciprocity does not
exist when certain owners retain some economic interests in their prop-
erty while others are left with none.
Furthermore, many commentators have adopted Justice Holmes's
observation that government could not function if it had to pay for
every burden it imposed. 6 This argument also fails to supply an ade-
quate justification for uncompensated regulation, because total depriva-
tions rarely occur.37 Additional considerations support a compensation
requirement for total deprivations. First, there is a heightened risk of a
disguised taking. It is more likely that the government's stated purpose
is actually a pretense to force private property into public service. 8
Second, many federal and state statutes acknowledge the nature of such
actions and provide for the exercise of eminent domain to accomplish
the equivalent result of otherwise burdensome regulations.3 9 Finally, in
31. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894. See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. "'[F]or what is land but the profits thereof[?]'" Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (quoting Sir
Edward Coke, 1 The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England ch. 1, § 1 (Johnson and
Warner, 1st Am. ed. 1812)).
33. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978)).
34. The term "average reciprocity of advantage" was used first by Justice Hollnes in Mahon.
See notes 68 and 209 and accompanying text.
35. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
36. Id. at 413.
37. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
38. Id. at 2894-95.
39. Id. at 2895. In many circumstances, the government may acquire the property outright or
impose servitudes that prevent its development. See, for example, Channel Islands National Park
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 410ff-l(a) (1980) (authorizing acquisition of "lands, waters, or interests [within
Channel Islands National Park] (including but not limited to scenic easements)"); Sawtooth Na-
tional Recreation Area Act, 16 U.S.C. § 460aa-2(a) (1972) (authorizing acquisition of "any lands,
or lesser interests therein, including mineral interests and scenic easements" within Sawtooth Na-
tional Recreation Area); Emergency Wetlands Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3921-3923 (1986) (au-
thorizing acquisition of wetlands); Environmental Policy Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-38 (1990)
(authorizing acquisition of, inter alia, "'scenic easements'" within the North Carolina natural and
scenic rivers system); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 11-15-101 to 11-15-108 (1992) (authorizing acquisition
19931 1289
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a total deprivation case, in which an owner is deprived of all of her real
property interest, compensation appears more deserved.
When a total deprivation of all economic use of the property or a
compelled permanent physical intrusion does not occur, the Court will
not apply a categorical compensation requirement. Thus, a landowner
whose deprivation is "one step short" may appear entitled to compen-
sation,40 but the results of past takings cases demonstrate that in many,
if not all, cases a landowner with even a ninety-five percent loss will
recover nothing. 41 Presumptions of constitutionality and assumptions of
reasonable burden further hinder the landowner's claim in the next
stage of ad hoc takings analysis.4"
For facial challenges, in which a statute's "mere enactment" alleg-
edly constitutes a taking, regulatory takings analysis is relatively
straightforward. Claimants must show that the regulation either (1)
fails to advance substantially a legitimate state interest, or (2) denies
them all economically viable use of their land.43 Claimants therefore
"face an uphill battle,"' 44 carrying a heavy burden of proof and facing a
great wall of presumptions of validity. Although recent cases apply the
heightened means scrutiny requirement, which requires land use regula-
tion to "substantially advance" a legitimate state interest, the results
generally favor claimants only when land use regulations require exac-
tions in return for permission for owners to use their land. 5 Otherwise,
the Court implicitly reviews the legitimacy prong with the broadest and
most deferential standard.46
A more common claim is the "as applied" challenge, in which the
implementation of the statute, rather than its mere enactment, alleg-
edly constitutes a taking. In these cases, the Court employs the two-
pronged test noted above, then applies a balancing test to determine
when "the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the
of "protective easements" and other rights in real property adjacent to state historical, architec-
tural, archaeological, or cultural resources).
40. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
41. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8. The Court believes that noncompensation occurs in only
"some cases" as an "occassional result." Id. (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the results of
Supreme Court cases speak for themselves. See, for example, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915) (finding no taking even when regulation diminished the fair market value of a parcel
from $800,000 to $60,000). See also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (emphasizing that "a
reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated with a taking" and finding no taking
of personal property). See also Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023 (3d
Cir. 1987) (finding no taking when regulation reduced the market value from $495,000 to $52,000).
42. See notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
43. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485; Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
44. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495.
45. See, for example, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
46. See note 41 and accompanying text.
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burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest .... ,, The
balancing test examines whether the public interests served justify the
burden on the owner..4  Although there is no strict formula for deter-
mining when a taking occurs,49 courts usually consider three factors: (1)
the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the regula-
tion's interference with the owner's reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectations; and (3) the character of the government's action. 0 Although
this might suggest some "firmly established" framework,5' these factors
are not used in every case, nor are they given equal or consistent
weight.
This balancing test is not without significant criticism52 and ap-
pears improper for a number of reasons. First, the government's inter-
est should not determine whether a regulatory action constitutes a
taking. Even when the most compelling interest justifies a physical ap-
propriation for public use, the government must compensate an owner
for physical takings.53 This compensation requirement also is consistent
with the doctrine of necessity, under which a person or the government
has the right to destroy another's property in cases of emergency, but is
47. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492. This is a subtle change of wording that shifts the presumption
of who should bear the burden of the regulation. Compare this language with the Court's original
quote in Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), in which the Court held that the Just
Compensation Clause is "designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Id. at
49.
48. In Keystone, the Court weighed the specific "important public interests" served by the
regulation against the coal companies' economic interests. Id. at 485.
49. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
50. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
51. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987).
52. See, for example, John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional
Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 465, 524 n.240 (1983) (commenting that the "mul-
tifactor balancing test" is not a real test, but rather an "amalgam of standards" that serve differ-
ent and often competing priorities); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the
Takings Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1892, 1927 (1992) (stating that the Court's "factor test
fails to achieve the purported purpose of the constitutional compensation requirement because it
does not prevent the government from unfairly 'forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens' ").
53. See Julius L. Sackman and Patrick J. Rohan, 2 Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain
§ 6.05 at 6-36 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1992) (stating: "It is universally conceded
that when land or other property is actually taken from the owner and put to use by the public
authorities, the constitutional obligation to make just compensation arises, however much the use
to which the property is put may enhance the public health, morals or safety"); W. Page Keeton,
et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 24 at 147 (West, 4th ed. 1971) (stating that "it is
likely that if property is damaged after being seized to prevent a public disaster, compensation is
required by the Fifth Amendment, unless the property was itself being used or likely to be used in
a dangerous way").
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required to compensate the owner for any damage.54 Thus, for limited
purposes the law permits both individuals and the government to in-
fringe upon an individual's property provided the owner is compensated
for any resulting damage. This per se compensation requirement should
extend to total deprivations caused by regulatory takings as well. 55
Although a technical "taking" occurs whenever public or private
necessity requires a physical intrusion on an owner's property, compen-
sation generally mitigates the apparent burdens imposed. For instance,
if a government official destroys a house to prevent the spread of a fire,
or destroys an infectious tree or animal to prevent the spread of dis-
ease, a layman might suggest that the house, animal, or tree was
"taken" by government action. Indeed, the invasion in such circum-
stances is physical and not the regulatory equivalent. Nevertheless, the
value of a house in the path of a fire arguably is worth nothing at the
moment it is "taken," even if the fire takes an unexpected turn.' Simi-
larly, a diseased tree or animal is worth nothing if the legal use for the
diseased tree or animal is limited or its destruction by the disease is
assured.57 Thus, even if these properties are deemed "taken," the own-
ers would be entitled only to nominal compensation. Similarly, if a
building is not a common-law nuisance, but is destroyed due to its age
and unsanitary conditions, the property. normally should be deemed
"taken," and the owner should be entitled to compensation. The owner,
nevertheless, is entitled to compensation only for the value of the build-
ing destroyed less the cost of improving the building to a sanitary con-
dition. Under this type of analysis, it is clear that government may
"take" an owner's property without paying compensation.
Compensation, rather than the issue of relevant "property" or the
notion of "taken," therefore, should provide the underlying rationale
behind such cases. In each case, a balancing test is unnecessary to pro-
tect the public's most substantial interests in health and safety; the
compelled destructions of property would require compensation but for
the lack of value of the destroyed property. Similar treatment, there-
54. See W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 24 at 147.
55. This premise logically flows from the understanding that a total deprivation of economi-
cally viable use or value "has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes" as a physical
taking. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (stating that the right to
coal consists of the right to mine coal).
56. See Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-22 (1879) (denying compensation to owners of
houses destroyed to prevent the spread of fire). The reasoning is that the fire itself would have
destroyed the house; therefore, it had no remaining value.
57. See W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 24 at 147 n.16
(cited in note 53).
58. See Hoffman v. County of Greenville, 129 S.E.2d 757 (S.C. 1963). This effectively reduces
compensation to almost zero.
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fore, may be extended under regulatory takings analysis without placing
an undue burden on government.59
Another problem with the "balancing test" is its inherent weight in
favor of the government; our Lady Justice discretely presses her thumb
upon the scales like an unscrupulous butcher. For example, courts view
all regulation with a presumption of constitutionality and reasonable-
ness even though government agencies now perform many legislative
functions. Such circumstances conflict with the traditional basis of judi-
cial deference, when the Court presumed that an owner could reasona-
bly "appeal . . . to the legislature, or to the ballot-box, not to the
judiciary." 0 These presumptions were true in the past, when the legis-
lature drafted most regulations. Today, however, regulations frequently
are a set of skeletal rules that are developed and implemented by
unelected officials and commissions. Accountability to the public, there-
fore, is not as direct as when judicial presumptions of constitutionality
were first made. In addition, immediate health and safety issues consti-
tuted the principal police power justifications for land use regulations
before the middle-twentieth century. By contrast, aesthetic and envi-
ronmental concerns comprise an expanded use of the police power to-
day." The Court's role in examining exercises of police power is "an
extremely narrow one[,]" 62 and its deference is so great that for the
public use to be found illegitimate, it must be "palpably without rea-
sonable foundation."
6 3
59. For example, compensation for ordinances restricting construction in coastal wetlands
should be valued as property ineligible for federal flood insurance, which subsidizes the true cost of
insurance in many coastal zones. Without such flood insurance, the value of the properties would
be dramatically reduced.
60. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 686 (1888).
61. The Court in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), accepted aesthetics alone as a regula-
tory justification. In Berman, Justice Douglas opined for the Court: "The concept of the public
welfare is broad and inclusive .... The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aes-
thetic as well as monetary." Id. at 33. The use of aesthetics alone as a police power justification
reached its judicial high-water mark in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), in
which Justice Douglas again declared for the Court that the police power "is ample to lay out
zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people." Id. at 9.
The common categories of regulation and taking claims include mining regulation, protection
of wetlands, protection of beaches, regulation of flood-prone areas, creation of open spaces in new
subdivisions, control of population density, preservation of historic structures, time planning of
residential development, and aesthetic controls. Fred P. Bosselman, David L. Callies, and John S.
Banta, The Taking Issue: An Analysis of the Constitutional Limits of Land Use Control 141-94
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).
62. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
63. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (citing United States v. Get-
tysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)). This is the broadest standard to review the legiti-




More significantly, the balancing test subjects the takings claim to
a muddle of due process and takings analysis. 4 This confusion is caused
by the Court's overlap and mixing of the two analyses in almost every
takings case. The Court's failure to distinguish the two analyses has led
some commentators to suggest that a "Unified Model" now exists,
under which the takings clause and due process clause are merged .
5
Others call for the Court simply to change its inquiry into an explicit
due process analysis, either substantive or procedural, contending that
the balancing test essentially is a due process inquiry.6 Although this
latter point is true, it is unclear that the Court ever intended to abolish
the takings possibility for confiscatory regulations.
Justice Holmes originally used takings analysis because due process
alone could not provide sufficient protection to landowners. Moreover,
the Lucas opinion suggests that the Court recognizes a distinction in
form, if not in substance, by adding a threshold takings step. Following
Lucas, the Court apparently will examine whether the regulation com-
pelled a permanent physical invasion or destroyed all economic use of
the property. If so, the government must provide some form of just
compensation. By contrast, if the property still retains some economi-
cally viable use and was not physically invaded, the Court then will bal-
ance the public and private interests.
6 7
The diminution in value test, if given greater force as an indepen-
dent method of takings analysis, would prevent claimants' cases from
being thrown into the balancing test's hotchpot of due process and tak-
ings analyses. The remaining compensation issue would alleviate many
apparent fiscal burdens on government by permitting alternative, non-
monetary forms of compensation. 8 In this manner, certainty as well as
objective equity may prevail.
64. See generally Rose, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561 (cited in note 12).
65. See Michael J. Davis and Robert L. Glicksman, To the Promised Land: A Century of
Wandering and a Final Homeland for the Due Process and Taking Clauses, 68 Or. L. Rev. 393,
401 (1989).
66. See Sackman and Rohan, 2 Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain § 6.21[5] at 146
(Supp. 1992) (cited in note 53) (quoting the amicus curiae brief that the United States Department
of Justice submitted in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985): "The reason there is so much confusion in the area of taking and land use devel-
opment is that the Court should not consider whether or not there has been a compensable taking
under the Fifth Amendment, but whether there has been a violation of due process, either sub-
stantive or procedural.... [W]hile the Court may have spoken in terms of property rights being
taken, in actuality all of the tests set forth in the cases through the years have been based upon
violation of due process. Mugler v. Kansas .. . Mahon ... Penn Central .... All of the tests set
forth in those prior decisions while couched in terms of property right really speak in terms of
violation of due process.").
67. See notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
68. Even if "property" is defined narrowly for purposes of determining whether the "prop-
erty" has been deprived of all economically viable use, the government or the Court, or both, still
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Post-Lucas Re2ulatory Takin2s Analysis
Yes
Was adequate monetary compensation or a
non-monetary equivalent provided, either by
statute or by an administrative review board?
a. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). See also text at note 24.
b. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). See also note 26 and accompany-
ing text.
c. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). See also notes 29 and 205 and
accompanying text.
d. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). See also notes 28-35 and accompa-
nying text.
e. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). See also notes 47-51 and accom-
panying text.
f. See note 68 and accompanying text.
may employ non-monetary compensation (such as granting transfer development rights (TDRs), if
deemed legitimate compensation, or finding an "average reciprocity of advantage" to the owner)
when a narrow property definition causes a total deprivation. Such treatment of "property" would
allow the Court to avoid the subjectivity of the multifactor balancing test and shift the analysis
into the objective realm of whether the form of compensation is "just." This route also separates
the examination of whether such compensation is just, because non-monetary compensation is in-
cluded within the muddle of the balancing test and too easily presumed "just" (as in Penn Cent.
Transp. Co.).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
B. Background of the Diminution in Value Test
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,e0 Justice Holmes held that
government regulation of private property could go only so far before
courts would recognize it as a taking. As discussed earlier, Justice
Holmes did not indicate what "property" or just how "far," but he set
forth a number of competing considerations to determine when fairness
requires the drawing of compensable metes and bounds. Proponents of
both sides of the takings issue employ these considerations to justify
either a narrow or a broad view of what property should constitute the
"whole" in the diminution in value test. In favor of a narrow definition
of the "whole" property that would provide greater protection for
smaller interests of value, Justice Holmes opined: "We are in danger of
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change. '70 Supporting a broad and
inclusive definition of the "whole," Justice Holmes recognized that gov-
ernment could not function if it was unable to decrease property values
slightly without being liable for reparation.7 1 Cases that deny landown-
ers compensation for their losses frequently cite this quotation.7
These opinions, however, generally ignore Justice Holmes's warning
that the implied limitation on the property rights of an owner "must
have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. ' 73 Jus-
tice Holmes noted that government must exercise its power of eminent
domain and pay just compensation in almost all cases when the diminu-
tion reaches a certain magnitude. 74 Although Justice Holmes's opinion
arguably sides with a more protective view of property rights, subse-
quent Supreme Court opinions reflect both of these conflicting
concerns.
Ambiguity presents the greatest problem with the diminution in
value test 7 5 because the test leaves two principal issues unanswered.
69. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
70. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
71. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. Justice Holmes specifically stated: "Government hardly could go
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law.... [S]ome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and
must yield to the police power." Id.
72. See, for example, Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
73. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. Ironically, these protections appear to be gone. The takings
arena remains the only substantial forum of protection for property interests from government
regulation.
74. Id.
75. This fact has led some Justices to claim that the "deprivation of all economically benefi-
cial use" rule is "wholly arbitrary." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see id.
at 2895 n.8 (Scalia, J., writing for the Court, responding to Justice Stevens's dissent).
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First, the test does not delineate precisely what degree of diminution in
value constitutes a taking. The Court recently held in Lucas7 6 that com-
pensation is required whenever a regulation deprives property of all ec-
onomically valuable use, unless such restricted use constitutes an
historical common-law nuisance under state law.7 7 Accordingly, a regu-
latory restriction that causes a one hundred percent devaluation clearly
results in a per se taking.78 The Court, however, has declined to state a
"set formula" to determine when a diminution of less than one hundred
percent constitutes a taking, preferring to decide cases on an ad hoc
basis.7e By contrast, the magnitude issue would not be as significant if
the destruction of certain recognized and protected interests, rather
than a broadly interpreted "parcel as a whole," constituted the relevant
compensable interest.
Even if the Court could determine the magnitude of a permissible
diminution, a more fundamental and antecedent question would re-
main: what unit of relevant property should serve as the denominator
of the "'deprivation' fraction"? 0 How much of what was affected? 8
The definition of "property" is crucial not only for determining a tangi-
ble magnitude of the diminution of value or interference with one's
right to use, but also for determining the fairness of the regulation
based on its economic impact on the individual property owner. Al-
though the Court has indicated that a method exists for defining what
"property" constitutes the denominator in the takings equation,8" in
Lucas the Court expressly denied the existence of such a method and
suggested an alternative approach to the problem.8 Before examining
the Lucas opinion, it is helpful to review certain prior decisions to un-
derstand the present labyrinth and ongoing struggle in the field.
76. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
77. Id. at 2901-02.
78. This presumes the case is ripe for review. See notes 161-65 and accompanying text for
discussion of ripeness.
79. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987). See also
Epstein, 1987 S. Ct. Rev. at 4 (cited in note 21).
Some commentators also argue that the Constitution distinguishes "deprivations" and "tak-
ings." They point to the Fifth Amendment's explicit language and note that the compensation
requirement only applies to takings, whereas deprivations only require due process scrutiny. See,
for example, Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 Buff. L. Rev. 735, 743-
44 (1985).
80. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497. See also Epstein, 1987 S. Ct.
Rev. at 16-17 (cited in note 21); Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1192, 1232-33 (cited in note 21).
81. See Rose, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 566 (cited in note 12).
82. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), in which the Court held: "The framework for
examining the question whether a regulation of property amounts to a taking requiring just com-
pensation is firmly established and has been regularly and recently reaffirmed." Id. at 713.
83. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
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In a series of cases now commonly referred to as the "bundle of
rights" cases, the Supreme Court considered whether the destruction of
only one right in the "bundle" of ownership rights by government regu-
lation constitutes a taking. These cases generally involved the regula-
tion of personal property, and must be distinguished as such, but they
provide the background for subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing
with a single right alone as denominator property in real property cases.
The Court currently recognizes three rights as fundamental: (1) the
right of disposition (the jus disponendi); (2) the right of possession (the
jus possidendi), which generally includes the right to exclude (the jus
prohibendi); and (3) the right of use (the jus utendi).84
The Court considered the right to dispose of one's property in An-
drus v. Allard.8 5 In Andrus, the Court held that federal regulations that
prohibit the sale of Indian artifacts containing feathers of protected
birds did not effect a taking.88 The Court observed that the regulations
destroyed only the right to sell the artifacts.87 The regulations expressly
preserved the owners' rights to possess, transport, donate, or devise the
artifacts. 8 The Court opined, therefore, that the destruction of a single
"strand" in the whole "bundle" of property rights did not constitute a
taking.8 9 According to the Court, the regulations simply prohibited the
most profitable use of the property.90 Although the district court found
that the prohibition deprived claimants of any opportunity to earn a
profit from their property,"1 the Supreme Court categorized the effect
as a mere "reduction in value."9" The Court posited, albeit dubiously,
that some economic benefit remained because the claimants could
charge admission to see the artifacts.98 By finding that value remained
in the property, the Court avoided finding a taking. The Court con-
84. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). See also
Restatement of Property § 5, cmt. e, at 11 (1936); Sackman and Rohan, 2 Nichols' The Law of
Eminent Domain § 5.01 (cited in note 53) ("What Constitutes Property"). But see Roger A. Cun-
ningham, William B. Stoebuck, and Dale A. Whitman, The Law of Property § 1.2 at 7 (West,
1984) (stating that property rights include: "(1) a right of possession (jus possidendi); (2) a right of
exclusion (jus prohibendi); (3) a right of disposition (ius disponendi); (4) a right of use (jus
utendi); (5) a right to enjoy fruits or profits (jus fruendi); (6) a right of destruction (jus
abutendi)").
85. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
86. Id. at 67-68. The regulations were adopted by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to
the Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1978), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16
U.S.C. § 703 (1974).
87. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65.
88. Id. at 64.
89. Id. at 65-66.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 64.




cluded that the loss of future profits, without a "physical property re-
striction," is a "slender reed" on which to base a takings claim.9
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,95 a developer converted a coastal
pond into a marina and dredged a channel to allow boat access to and
from an adjacent bay. Because the pond was private property under
Hawaii law, the developer controlled access to and use of the pond. The
United States Corps of Engineers nevertheless asserted that the im-
provements made the pond a "navigable water" and sued the developer
to prevent it from denying the public access to the pond.96 The Court
recognized that the right to exclude others is "one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as prop-
erty .... -"7 The Court held that the right to exclude is universally
recognized as a fundamental element of the property right, and there-
fore the Government had to compensate the owner if it denied him that
right."' The Corps's consent to the dredging and its failure to condition
the dredging operations did not "estop" the government from imposing
its regulations, but it created a number of "expectancies" embodied in
the concept of "property" protected by the takings clause. 9 The gov-
ernment ordinarily could guarantee the public a right of free access to
"navigable waters" if it so chose,100 but the government's actions in this
case gave rise to a compensable taking.' The government action im-
posed "temporary" physical invasions on the owner's private property,
not merely a "substantial devaluation" of the property.10 2 The Court,
therefore, held that a taking had occured. 0 3
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,'04 a shopping center
owner appealed the California Supreme Court's decision prohibiting his
exclusion of students who sought to distribute political pamphlets and
to solicit support for their cause on his premises. The Court held that
the impairment of the right to exclude in this case did not amount to a
94. Id.
95. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
96. Id. at 166-67. The Corps originally acquiesced to the dredging of the channel to the bay
when Kaiser Aetna notified the Corps of its plans in 1961. Id. at 167.
97. Id. at 176.
98. Id. at 179-80. In addition, the Court ruled that the right to exclude "falls within this
category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation." Id.
99. Id. at 179.
100. The government's power to impose a navigational servitude arises from the Commerce
Clause rather than the power of eminent domain. Id. at 169. Here, however, the government's




104. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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compensable taking.'015 The restraint on the right to exclude did not
"unreasonably impair the value or the use of [the] property as a shop-
ping center."'1 6 Free speech concerns clearly motivated the Court's de-
cision, indicating that PruneYard might be limited to its facts.
107
Moreover, the Court held that the shopping center still could regulate
the location and the manner of solicitation to minimize interference
with its retail operations.0 8 The Court distinguished Kaiser Aetna be-
cause in Kaiser Aetna the government's interference would have in-
fringed substantially on Kaiser Aetna's "reasonable investment backed
expectations" and the federal government did not possess the "residual
authority" to define property rights. 0 9 Subsequent opinions also distin-
guished PruneYard from compelled physical invasion cases such as
Loretto,"0 because Loretto involved a "permanent" physical invasion
rather than a mere "temporary" invasion"'
In Hodel v. Irving,"2 the Supreme Court revisited the right to dis-
pose of one's property, previously addressed in Andrus v. Allard.1 3 In
Hodel, the Court invalidated a statute that provided for automatic es-
cheat of minor Indian holdings of real property. The statute completely
destroyed the owners' rights to dispose of their real property. The opin-
ion strongly suggests that the Court will not apply Andrus to real prop-
erty cases when a regulation completely destroys the right to dispose."
4
The right to possession and the right to exclude, if totally de-
stroyed, will result in one of two categorizations. Loretto"5 exemplifies
105. Id. at 85.
106. Id. at 83.
107. Id. at 96-100 (Powell, J., and White, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (stating
that "our decision is limited to the type of shopping center involved in this case"). The Court in
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 n.1 (1987), also observed that a public
right of permanent access was not imposed in PruneYard because the owner opened the shopping
center to the public. Thus, the right to exclude is not "essential" to the use or economic value of
the property in only limited circumstances.
But see Curtis J. Berger, PruneYard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 633 (1991), reprinted in 23 Land Use & Env't L. Rev. 79 (1992) (stressing the importance
of accessible public forums for free speech and indicating the potential for expansion of First
Amendment protection into other appropriate properties).
108. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83.
109. Id. at 84.
110. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
111. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12.
112. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
113. See notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
114. Although the majority opinion in Hodel does not expressly overturn Andrus, the con-
currence of Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell joined, held that
Hodel effectively limited Andrus to its facts. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 719. The recent prominence of
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist in takings jurisprudence may suggest that the majority
would adopt this opinion in any subsequent Supreme Court review.
115. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
1300 [Vol. 46:1283
FIFTH AMENDMENT "PROPERTY"3
one such category; the statute compelled the owner to suffer a perma-
nent physical invasion. A permanent physical invasion completely and
permanently destroys the owner's right to exclude. The result is a per
se taking that is clearly compensable. By contrast, Kaiser Aetna"6 pro-
vides an example of a second takings category in which the compelled
invasions of public boats were merely "temporary" in nature."' Al-
though such invasions may destroy the right to possess and exclude
temporarily, the complete destruction of this right, whether permanent
or temporary, appears to be a per se taking, with a narrow exception for
shopping centers due to the conflicting constitutional interest.118
Although these cases involved the impact of physical invasions on
the right to possess and exclude, other cases provide similar examples
of regulations that infringe upon, but do not completely destroy, the
right to possess and exclude. Therefore, the Court has not required gov-
ernment compensation.
For example, in Yee v. City of Escondido,"9 the Court found that a
municipal rent control ordinance applicable to mobile home park own-
ers did not compel an "unwanted" physical occupation.2 0 The park
owners asserted that the ordinance made the mobile home owners per-
petual tenants on their properties. The ordinance required park owners
to continue their leases at below-market rates unless their property was
converted for other permitted uses. In effect, the claimants contended,
the ordinance transferred to the tenants "a right of physical occupa-
tion" of their land.' 2 ' In addition, the park owners claimed that the
ordinance transferred an increase in the value to the tenants for their
lots and mobile homes by mandating below-market rates.' 22 The te-
nants would realize this gain if they sold their mobile homes and sites
because the rental rates would remain below-market.'
The Court rejected these arguments and held that the government
had authorized neither a mandatory nor a permanent physical occupa-
tion of the owners' lands. 124 The government did not compel a tempo-
rary invasion because the petitioners "voluntarily" leased their land to
116. See notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
117. In temporary invasion cases, the invading objects or persons do not remain on the prop-
erty permanently.
118. See notes 104-11 and accompanying text (discussing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robbins).
119. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
120. Id. at 1531.
121. Id. at 1528.
122. Id. at 1529.




mobile home owners. 2 ' Moreover, the owners were not compelled to
rent their land because they could cease their mobile home park opera-
tions and convert the property to other permitted uses.12 The occupa-
tion therefore was neither compelled nor permanent in the Court's
view.127 Unlike Kaiser Aetna, the right to exclude arguably was not
abolished completely because of the park owners' initial "voluntary" ac-
ceptance of the rental tenants. Under this rationale, rent controls gen-
erally would not destroy completely the values associated with the right
to possess and exclude. Rent controls under some circumstances, how-
ever, may become so onerous as to amount to a compensable taking.
Seawall Associates v. City of New York12 1 provides an example in
which compelled rent control amounted to a per se compensable taking
by entirely destroying the right to exclude. 129 In Seawall, an ordinance
prohibited the demolition, alteration, or conversion of certain low-cost
rental properties. The ordinance required the owners to restore all units
to a habitable condition and to lease them indefinitely at controlled
rents. The ordinance also imposed substantial monetary penalties for
noncompliance. 3 0 The New York Supreme Court held that these un-
compensated obligations and restrictions amounted to a taking.'
Under this court's analysis, the compelled rental requirements de-
stroyed the owners' fundamental right to possess their properties.' 32 Al-
though the regulation did not destroy all uses of the properties, it
compelled the owners to devote their property to a single, unantici-
pated, and potentially unprofitable use. 3 3 The law permitted the own-
ers to dispose of or sell their properties, and thus did not totally destroy
the right of disposition. The restrictions economically impaired this
right, however, by reducing the potential sales price for the properties
to an amount substantially lower than their pre-restriction purchase
prices.
125. Id. at 1530. See also FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987), in which the
claimants alleged that the Pole Attachments Act, 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1988), caused a physical taking
of the utility company's poles. The FCC regulated certain rates that the utility company could
charge cable television operators who lease poles to carry their television cables. The Court held
that there was no "required acquiescence" in this case and found that there was no physical tak-
ing. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 252-53.
126. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1530-31.
127. Id. at 1531.
128. 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (1989), cert. denied 110 S. Ct. 500 (1989).
129. Although denials of certiorari have no precedential force, the fact that the Supreme
Court left the case undisturbed in subsequent possession cases suggests that the rationale may find
support at the federal level as well.
130. Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1063.
131. Id. at 1065.




Unlike Yee, the owners in Seawall did not "voluntarily" admit te-
nants onto their properties; no tenants resided on the premises at the
time the ordinance was enacted. Additionally, the ordinance prohibited
alternative uses not involving tenants, compelled the owners to accept
tenants at controlled rental rates, and penalized the owners for using
their property for personal use or even no use at all..3 4 Under these
circumstances, the rent control ordinance totally destroyed the right to
possess and impaired values associated with other rights. The court,
therefore, held that the ordinance amounted to a taking.
13 5
The right of use represents the third fundamental right recognized
and protected by the Supreme Court. This right also is the one most
frequently affected by regulation. The protected right of use is defined
more specifically as the right of economically viable use. The right of
economically viable use appears to be abolished by the complete restric-
tion of either of two essential uses: (1) the right to receive reasonable
rents from one's land, or (2) the right to build something on one's land.
This proposition is based on two common notions: first, that an owner
expects to reap profits when purchasing land;136 and second, that the
common law rarely denies an owner the "essential uses" of her land.
13 7
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,' the Court explicitly
observed in dicta that building something on one's own land is a right
of ownership, not a privilege granted by the government.' In Nollan,
the state demanded an easement across the beach front of the owner's
property before a building restriction would be lifted. The regulation
did not completely destroy the right to build because it permitted the
owner to develop his property provided construction did not exceed the
size of his previous dwelling. Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the
restriction. 40 The Court based its holding, however, on a close scrutiny
of the nexus between the restriction imposed and the harm to be pre-
vented.14 ' It hald that the exaction demanded by the state in return for
lifting the restriction did not "substantially advance" a legitimate state
interest. 2 The Court therefore did not employ the diminution in value
test. Other courts examining the construction right through the diminu-
134. Id. at 1063.
135. Id. at 1065.
136. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (quoting Sir Edward Coke, 1 The First Part of the Insti-
tutes of the Laws of England ch. 1, § 1 (Johnson and Warner, 1st Am. ed. 1812) (stating, "[Flor
what is land but the profits thereof[?]")).
137. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901 (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)).
138. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
139. Id. at 833-34 n.2.
140. Id. at 841-42.




tion analysis have held, however, that restrictions which still allow an
owner to construct a single family house do not constitute a total dimi-
nution.143 Thus, the right to build something may be a fundamental
use, but this right may be used in diminution analysis either to support
or undermine an owner's claim.
Rent control presents another restriction that infringes upon the
right to use and the above-mentioned right to exclude. As evidenced by
Yee,'4 rent control ordinances are not facially per se takings of prop-
erty. 1 45 The Court has noted and reaffirmed consistently the States'
broad power to regulate housing conditions in general, and landlord-
tenant relationships in particular, without compensating owners for
every economic injury produced by such regulations.'" Moreover, the
Court remains firm in its position that "'statutes regulating the eco-
nomic relations of landlords and tenants are not per se takings.' ,,'47
The Supreme Court has avoided direct consideration of the rent
control issue on grounds of ripeness, 48 but certain opinions suggest that
a close nexus test could be used to examine a rent control ordinance's
effect on use. In Pennell v. City of San Jose,'49 a city rent control ordi-
nance required officials to consider the "hardship to a tenant" when
determining whether to approve a rent increase proposed by a land-
lord. °50 A landlord and landlords' association contended that the ordi-
nance (1) violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and
(2)y as applied, constituted a taking.' The plaintiffs alleged that when
a hearing officer weighed the "hardship to a tenant" and reduced the
rent below what otherwise would be "reasonable," the reduced amount
would constitute a taking. Additionally, the reduction would not serve
the legitimate purpose of prohibiting excessive rents because this goal
was accomplished by consideration of six objective factors related to the
landlord's costs and the condition of the rental market.'52 Rather, assis-
tance to hardship tenants through rent reduction served only to trans-
fer the landlord's property, his jus fruendi, to specific hardship tenants.
In making this argument, plaintiffs pointed to the often-cited basis of
143. See, for example, Moskow v. Comm'r of Dep't of Envir. Management, 427 N.E.2d 750,
753 (Mass. 1981); Lovequist v. Conservation Comm'n of Dennis, 393 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Mass. 1979).
144. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1528.
145. Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 12 n.6 (1988).
146. Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 485 U.S. 419, 440
(1982)).
147. Id. (quoting FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987)).
148. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 9-10.
149. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
150. Id. at 5-6.
151. Id. at 4.
152. Id. at 9.
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the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause, which is to prevent
government from forcing an individual to bear a cost that the public as
a whole should assume.
153
The plaintiffs in Pennell clearly presented a powerful argument.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, would have found a taking without just compensa-
tion.154 Justice Scalia observed that traditional land-use regulations
existed to prevent property uses that created social problems.155 Tradi-
tionally, a cause-and-effect relationship existed, with a close nexus be-
tween the regulation and the problem that it sought to remedy. A
landowner was targeted only when his use was the source of the public
evil.
158
By contrast, the landlords in Pennell did not cause the problems of
poor tenants. The "hardship" tenant provision simply provided a politi-
cally attractive means to transfer wealth off the books. 57 This provision
violated the general principle that one man's misfortunes do not justify
shifting his burdens to his neighbor's shoulders. 5 8 The regulation per-
mitted a use of funds that, if taken through taxation and made availa-
ble to the government, the public might have allocated elsewhere. In
sum, the regulation avoided the government's traditional method to
provide cash, goods, or services to the poor by using taxes raised from
the general public. Taxation, according to Justice Scalia's analysis, is
the only constitutionally permissible method to provide welfare ser-
vices.1 59 This opinion appears derived from, or at least is supported by,
Justice Holmes's opinion in Mahon, in which he recognized that a
strong desire to provide for the general welfare cannot justify achieving
that goal by any means other than "the constitutional way of paying for
the change."'"6
Nevertheless, the Court refused to reach this issue in Pennell on
ripeness grounds."6 Ripeness remains the most significant barrier to a
153. The Just Compensation Clause's purpose is "'to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.'" Pennell, 485 U.S. at 9 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 49 (1960))).
154. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. Id. at 20.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 22.
158. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
159. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 21-22.
160. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
161. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 10.
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regulatory takings claim.162 In an "as applied" challenge, a taking can
arise only after an owner appeals to the proper administrative bodies
and hearings officers rule on the issue.163 In Pennell, the majority held
that the parties failed to show that the challenged statute specifically
took any property, and thus did not present a "sufficiently concrete fac-
tual setting" for the Court to rule on this claim.16 4 Observers should
note, however, that Justices Scalia and O'Connor did not believe ripe-
ness to be a problem for the plaintiffs' case. 65 Given their prevailing
role in Lucas and Nollan and their clear interest in hearing such claims,
it is possible that the ripeness barrier will not stand as high for future
claimants.
Other Supreme Court cases concern the use of a physical segment
of property that is less than the general whole. These cases followed the
"bundle of rights" cases when examining segments of space within the
so-called "parcel as a whole."'' 6 For example, in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City, 67 the Court examined whether the
government's denial of the owner's request to build over New York's
Grand Central Station constituted a taking. The Court observed that
government regulation may deprive an owner of the most profitable use
of his property without constituting an "unconstitutional taking."'6 8
Noting that general welfare legislation frequently burdens some owners
more than others, the Court ruled that a disparate impact alone does
not necessarily amount to a taking.'69 The Court mixed takings and due
process considerations and held that regulations do not need to produce
reciprocal benefits as long as restrictions (1) are reasonably related to
162. Ripeness and exhaustion of administrative remedies still present a tremendous hurdle
for claimants, especially in "as applied" challenges. These issues have been used by the Supreme
Court and many other courts to avoid deciding difficult takings issues. See, for example, Pennel v.
San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 10 (1988) (finding the factual setting not "sufficiently concrete" for ruling on
the claim); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980). See also Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (finding an
"as applied" claim not ripe for review); Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash.2d 320,
787 P.2d 907 (1990) (holding that failure to exhaust administrative remedies when the remedies
were not futile precluded consideration of the case).
163. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 9-10.
164. Id. at 10.
165. Id. at 18-19.
166. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497 (quoting Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31).
167. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
168. Id. at 123-28. Note, however, the rhetorical force of this commonly cited quotation. An
"unconstitutional taking" is merely a taking without just compensation. The claimant's only rem-
edy should be compensation. Although "compensable taking" would be more accurate, "unconsti-
tutional taking" implies a greater restriction on the government's ability to act. The courts could
impose an injunction or void a government regulation for pure due process violations, and this is
what the term "unconstitutional" is intended to evoke. The Court's mixing of the two analyses in
the majority of cases continues to obscure the proper remedy.
169. Id. at 133.
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the implementation of a legitimate policy; (2) are expected to create a
widespread public benefit; and (3) apply to all similarly situated prop-
erty.170 When examining the diminution suffered by the owner, the
Court held that takings analysis does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and then examine whether the regulation destroyed
all of the rights in a particular segment.171 Instead, the Court held that
it must perform a balancing test to consider the character of the gov-
ernment's action and the extent of the interference with "rights in the
parcel as a whole ... .171 The Court found that Penn Central would
receive a reasonable rent without building the denied renovation, and
that it could resubmit different plans for future development.' More-
over, the city's interest in historic preservation weighed more in the
mind of the Court, and it therefore denied the takings challenge.1
74
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis,7 5 the Court
revisited a statute substantially similar to the statute in Mahon. The
Court distinguished the Keystone statute from the Mahon statute be-
cause of its artful designation of numerous public, rather than private,
interests.176 The Court categorized the Keystone statute as involving
the general public, whereas the Mahon statute concerned only one
homeowner.'7 7 Justice Stevens also delineated a framework that distin-
guished "mere restrictions" on use from takings of property.178 Justice
Stevens rationalized that the "ownership" of a thing is not "taken" if
the owner can make some productive use of that thing. 79 Justice Ste-
vens cited Professor Frank I. Michelman, a leading takings commenta-
tor, when deciding that the Court must compare the value taken with
the value that remains in the property.'8 0 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens
employed a test that Professor Michelman clearly discredited and
reached a result that he seemingly would not support.'
8 '
170. Id. at 133-34 n.30.
171. Id. at 130.
172. Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 137.
174. Id. at 138.
175. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
176. See id. at 476 n.6.
177. Id. at 483.
178. Id. at 485-97.
179. Id. at 501 (holding, "Because petitioners retain the right to mine . . the burden the Act
places on the support estate does not constitute a taking.").
180. 480 U.S. at 497 (stating that "[b]ecause our test for regulatory taking requires us to
compare the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the prop-
erty, one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property 'whose value is
to furnish the denominator of the fraction'" (quoting Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1192 (cited
in note 21))). See also Epstein, 1987 S. Ct. Rev. at 16-17 (cited in note 21).
181. See Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1193 (cited in note 12):
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The statute specifically targeted the support estates previously
purchased by the coal companies. Under Pennsylvania law, this estate
coexisted with the mineral and surface estates. The support estate gave
its owner the right to demand support to the surface estate or, alterna-
tively, to deprive the surface estate of its support through mining.
Rather than treat the support estate independently for diminution
analysis, the Court deemed it part of the mineral estate. 1 2 Using a mul-
tifactor balancing test, the Court decided that the statute's public inter-
est outweighed the owner's interest and thus found no taking.183
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,"" a wetlands protec-
tion statute prohibited all construction on the claimant's land.185 Lucas
purchased the affected property before the enactment of the statute,
which contained no grandfather clause or other relief."8 " The Court held
that the total taking of all economically viable use of the land
amounted to a taking and remanded the case to determine compensa-
tion. 1'87 The Court also posited that when determining the takings equa-
tion denominator, the state's common law of property may provide the
answer because it shapes an owner's "reasonable expectations." 8 The
Court, therefore, may examine whether and to what degree the state's
law recognizes and protects the particular interest in land.'89
This opinion is consistent with PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 90 in which the Court held as a general proposition that the
Inasmuch as mining rights are well recognized, divisible interests in land, and inasmuch as
"rights" to particular surface uses have come to be recognized as species of "property" under
the label of "easement" or "servitude," why not say that my land consists of two
"things"-mining rights and surface rights, or foundry rights and residue-and that the rele-
vant denominator in testing a regulation which impinges only on mining rights or foundry
rights is the value of those rights-which the regulation totally destroys?
Id. (emphasis added). See also Epstein, 1987 S. Ct. Rev. at 17 (cited in note 21).
182. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 500-01.
183. Id. at 506.
184. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
185. Id. at 2888-90.
186. Lucas purchased the lots in 1986. The South Carolina legislature enacted the Beach-
front Management Act, S.C. Code § 48-39-250 et seq. (Supp. 1990) in 1988. The state amended
this Act to authorize its Coastal Council to issue "special permits" in certain circumstances for the
construction or reconstruction of habitable structures seaward of the Act's baseline. See S.C. Code
§ 48-39-290(D)(1) (Supp. 1991). The Court rejected South Carolina's argument that this amend-
ment rendered Lucas's claim unripe. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2891.
187. Upon remand, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992), the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the Coastal Council did not possess the authority under
state common law to prohibit Lucas from constructing a habitable structure on his land. Id. at 485.
In addition, the court held that Lucas suffered a compensable temporary taking, and directed the
lower court to award compensation based on the period from the enactment of the 1988 Act and
continuing through the date of this court order.
188. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
189. See id.
190. See notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
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United States, as opposed to the several states, does not possess the
authority to define "property" in the first instance. 191 Like other Su-
preme Court holdings, this opinion looks to state law to define prop-
erty.192 Lucas therefore expressly leaves open the issue of whether
interests in land, rather than the entire "bundle," will constitute the
denominator for the deprivation fraction. 19 8 Under the Lucas analysis,
courts may focus on the recognition and protection of the interest
under state law. This suggestion clearly is directed against the Key-
stone approach, in which the Court refused to recognize the support
estate as an independent interest for diminution analysis, even though
Pennsylvania common law recognized and protected it as a unique and
independent estate coequal with the mineral and surface estates. 94 The
usefulness of this distinction will determine whether the Supreme
Court or other courts will adopt this suggested approach.
III. THE BURDENS AND BENEFITS OF A COMMON DENOMINATOR
A. Problems Inherent in Defining a Common Denominator
Two principal issues arise when defining the relevant bundle of
property to which the "taken" portion is compared. First, if courts
adopt an expansive definition of the relevant property, holders of exten-
sive property must suffer a greater loss before a "total" taking occurs.
This definition permits politicians to saddle large landowners with bur-
dens that would constitute per se takings if imposed on lesser landown-
ers. Under such an approach, the diminution in value test merely
becomes a "deep pocket rule,"'' 95 rather than a test based on fairness.
This violates the "bedrock principle"' 96 underlying the Takings Clause:
to prevent government from forcing individuals to bear burdens alone
that, in all fairness and justice, ought to be shared by the public as a
191. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980).
192. See, for example, United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, 319
U.S. 266, 279 (1943) (defining "property" by looking to state law), and DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351
U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956) (defining "children" by looking to state law). See also United States v.
Certain Property Located in Borough of Manhattan, 344 F.2d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 1965); In re Tay-
lor & Dean Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 370, 372 (3d Cir. 1943); United States v. 252.36 Acres of Land, 336
F. Supp. 667, 668 (W.D. Penn. 1972). But see DeSylva, 351 U.S. at 581 (observing that federal
courts would be free to disregard an "entirely strange" idiosyncrasy in a particular state law).
193. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179
(1979) (stating that "property" consists of recognized expectancies); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593, 601 (1972) (observing that "property" involves mutually explicit understandings).
194. See text accompanying notes 182-83.
195. Rose, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 568 (cited in note 12).




whole. 197 An expansive definition also fails to protect political minori-
ties, such as large companies or wealthy individuals, from the whims of
a voting majority, a concern shared by a number of the Framers. 19 In-
deed, the wealth of the property owner appears to influence many
courts. The results of numerous cases support the contention of some
commentators that politics, not principles, guide the decisions in regu-
latory takings cases. 99
Narrowly defining the "whole" property to comprise lesser property
rights would cause many minor regulations to destroy completely the
economic value of those rights. Any definition of property must con-
sider the government's interest in efficiency when determining whether
it is fair to place a burden on an individual rather than the public as a
whole. Justice Holmes recognized this principle in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, writing, "Government hardly could go on" if it had to
compensate owners for every negative effect on values.200 Various com-
mentators, and the Court at times, employ this comment to justify not
compensating property owners for anything less than a total taking of a
fee simple and all of its bundle of interests.20 1 Whether this amounts to
mere rhetoric to win judicial deference or a realistic concern remains
open to debate. A narrow definition also could permit owners to split
their property rights or sell them to other people, thereby making even
a minor regulation a complete taking. Elaborate and socially useless
splitting could result, ultimately forcing the courts to reunite the "bun-
dle" of property rights to determine whether a taking has occurred.202
197. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). See also Pennell v. San Jose, 485
U.S. 1, 9 (1988); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304,
318-19 (1987); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
198. See Bender, 34 Buff. L. Rev. at 745 (cited in note 79). Bender contends that at least
some of the Framers supported the takings clause in order to prevent strong political majorities
from imposing unfair burdens on individual members of political minorities. Id. Bender states,
without citation, that this was "clearly" Madison's motivation, arising from his fear that debtors
and the poor would unite politically to take the property of "the rich and powerful." Id. at 745
n.21. Note, however, that Bender's statement does not explain what property could be taken from
a poor, powerful person, or alternatively, presupposes that only "the rich" were powerful.
199. See id. at 829 (commenting that the Takings Clause is currently enforced by judges' and
legislators' immediate social, economic, and political visions).
200. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
201. See, for example, Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124; Bender, 34 Buff. L. Rev. at
743 n.16 (cited in note 79) (stating, "Even Justice Holmes... recognized that government would
be hamstrung if it had to regulate by purchase."). See also notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
202. See Rose, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 568 (cited in note 12). But see Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2919
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that developers may "market specialized estates to take advantage
of the Court's new rule").
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Commentators, however, have suggested various alternative methods to
combat such abuse.0 3
Potential governmental and private abuses lurk at each end of the
definitional spectrum, prompting the question of whether any definition
can prevent these abuses. If property cannot be defined, the diminution
in value test, both as a categorical test and as one factor in a balancing
test, should be abolished and a new model sought out. If, however, the
relevant property can be defined by certain specific interests that do
not give rise to either of these abuses, such interests should receive per
se protection from regulatory takings. The enhanced position of the
diminution in value test as a potential per se takings category makes it
timely to review the potential uses of clearly defined "property."
B. Benefit of a Narrowly Defined Common Denominator
A categorical diminution in value test represents one of the few
regulatory taking tests that appears both manageable and sensible.
Moreover, it avoids the subjectivity and confusion of a balancing test.
Assuming no permanent physical invasion is compelled, a categorical
diminution in value analysis requires four basic inquiries. First, reflect-
ing a process threshold, the governmental act must substantially ad-
vance a legitimate government interest.20 4 Second, the proscribed use
must not constitute a nuisance under state common law.2 0 5 Third, a to-
tal deprivation of the economically beneficial use of a property interest
must occur. Finally, if a total deprivation has occurred, just compensa-
tion must be provided. If the government does not provide for just com-
pensation in its regulatory scheme, the courts should provide a just
remedy.
In general, the first prong requiring substantial advancement of a
legitimate state interest is satisfied because today the scope of the po-
lice power has few limits.20 6 The vast majority of governmental regula-
tions or acts will find justification in some general welfare pretext.
203. Professor Rose observes that if an owner split "property rights to correspond perfectly
with a particular regulation," a court might solve the problem "by extending veil-piercing jurispru-
dence used in [tax] and [corporate] law, in order to compare the regulated property interest with
the balance of the [owner's] property rights." Rose, 575 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 568 n.43.
204. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
205. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. The case specifically refers to "background principles of nui-
sance and property law.. . ." Id. This approach unfortunately reinserts ambiguity into the equa-
tion because whether an act constitutes a nuisance is determined by a balancing test that considers
(1) the degree of harm to the public, (2) the social value of the claimant's activities, (3) the suita-
bility of such activities to the locality, and (4) the relative ease with which either the claimant or
the government can avoid the alleged harm. Id. at 2901.
206. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the Court may presume that a regulation substantially ad-
vances some legitimate state interest in all "as applied" challenges be-
cause only the government action and not the statute itself is alleged to
cause the taking. Thus, the heightened scrutiny apparent in Nollan
207
may afford the property owner some protection when the interest has
little relation to the restriction imposed, but the majority of regulatory
takings cases will pass easily through Nollan's nexus test.
After satisfying the legitimate government interest requirement,
and provided the proscribed use is not a nuisance, the Court analyzes
whether the government regulation or act amounts to a taking of "prop-
erty," which requires just compensation. Failure to define the relevant
property produces an analytical quagmire because courts are unable to
determine whether a regulation sufficiently affected the relevant prop-
erty to constitute a taking. Under these circumstances, courts turn to a
maze of balancing factors, mix the issues of taking and compensation,
and produce an ambiguous analysis. 08 The failure to decide the re-
quired degree of interference with the relevant property prevents a sep-
arate inquiry into just compensation. Compensation instead becomes
merely another factor in the balancing test. Separating the issues would
provide greater clarity and precision. If the regulation does not affect a
sufficient degree of a relevant property, then only a balancing test
would follow. If a sufficient interference with a relevant property inter-
est occurs, however, a taking automatically results and the focus would
move directly to the compensation issue. A set of identifiable property
interests therefore provides the cornerstone of an efficient takings test.
Shifting the focus to compensation rather than the other aspects of
the takings analysis arguably yields greater fairness to the owner. Com-
pensation analysis, with objective values of burdens and benefits, is less
subjective than either the scope of police power or relevant property
issues. An objective examination of value offers assurance that courts
and regulators will consider the real equities of a case. The compensa-
tion issue requiries a reciprocal benefit in return for the imposed bur-
den. Nevertheless, the compensation analysis still permits the courts a
great deal of flexibility to determine both the nature and amount of
compensation. For example, the courts may employ devices such as the
"average reciprocity of advantage," which are unavailable when there is
a permanent physical occupation. The term "average reciprocity of ad-
vantage" first appeared in Justice Holmes's opinion in Mahon to denote
207. See note 24 and accompanying text.
208. See, for example, Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 137 (presuming without any scru-
tiny that certain transfer development rights "undoubtedly mitigate" any financial burdens in-
curred by the landowner, thereby preventing the possibility of a total taking).
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the additional benefits that an owner derives from other similarly situ-
ated properties burdened by the same regulation.20 9 The benefits con-
ferred by a zoning ordinance typically will outweigh the burdens
imposed on particular owners, thus requiring no compensation.2 10 For
example, setback restrictions on buildings and houses may provide the
reciprocal benefits of added beauty and safety to all owners. Similarly,
the burden of height restrictions may be compensated in whole or in
part by the reciprocal advantages of light and air. When such reciproc-
ity does not exist, however, an owner may demand that the government
either show or provide another form of compensation.
The average reciprocity of advantage method has some limitations.
Courts cannot use this approach to justify a permanent physical occu-
pation. The permanent interference with an owner's privacy interest
demands compensation. If this were not the case, the state could deny
compensation because everyone shared the same burden of providing
easements for telephone or cable television lines. In more exaggerated
circumstances, the state could find reciprocal benefits to owners in pro-
viding quarters for government employees.
This Note does not attempt to examine the myriad of possibilities
for creative compensation by the legislature. The preceding analysis
simply demonstrates the current clog in takings analysis and that a
common denominator can enable the system to move on to other well-
defined parts. Takings analysis may prove more intelligible and efficient
by diverting the analysis away from the muddled issue of whether a
prerequisite act of "taking" has occurred, and shifting the principal
consideration into more objective areas.
IV. A MAP FOR A COMMON DENOMINATOR
A. General Issues and Unprotected Territory
A categorical compensation requirement for the destruction of
specified elements of an owner's land would provide greater certainty to
takings analysis. A narrow delineation of protected property interests
would identify a finite set of situations in which courts, planners, and
regulators would have to consider seriously objective factors of ade-
quate compensation. In addition, categorical compensation for narrow
interests would force planners and regulators to address the takings is-
sues before passing regulations as a matter of social policy. Such pre-
emptive planning would allow courts to avoid choosing between the
209. See note 68 and accompanying text.
210. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co, 438 U.S. at 144-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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current extremes of denying compensation or disrupting an entire legis-
lative scheme.
Professor Frank Michelman observed that the general public
misses opportunities to employ more innovative methods of settlement
and compensation by leaving the resolution of social conflicts exclu-
sively to the courts.21' Indeed, many proposals for novel compensation
suggest that the legislature should prompt such change rather than the
judiciary.212 Legislative compensation also can provide affected owners
with generous benefits beyond what the Constitution requires, a
method previously used to solve a number of problems. 1 s
Thus, the task remains to define the interests protected. The task
is more difficult because scholars generally delineate the contours of
property in ways that reflect different concerns with pragmatism, jus-
tice, social function, and philosophy.1 4 One must decide what interests
should be protected as Fifth Amendment property. Footnote seven in
Lucas calls for commentators to suggest what rights should receive cat-
egorical protection as denominator property.21 5 Moreover, one must
consider what interests could be protected without placing undue fiscal
restraints on the government's ability to function and whether such fis-
cal burdens to the government would outweigh the certainty gained by
categorical takings treatment.
Values alone clearly are not Fifth Amendment "property," nor do
they inhere in the title of land. Diminution in value alone, therefore,
does not constitute a taking.1 6 Similarly, no taking occurs merely be-
cause regulation prevents the owner's best or most profitable use of the
property. 1 7 Property values represent a risk that a landowner assumes
for better or for worse. Justice Holmes observed this reality, citing the
traditional expectation that "some values are enjoyed under an implied
211. Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1253 (cited in note 21). See also Manne, Note, 58 Tex.
L. Rev. at 1466 (cited in note 7).
212. See, for example, John J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Es-
say, 83 Yale L. J. 75, 127-28 (1973); Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1253-56 (cited in note 21). See
generally Manne, Note, 58 Tex. L. Rev. at 1466-67 (cited in note 7); Donald G. Hagman and Dean
J. Misczynski, eds., Windfalls for Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compensation (Planners,
1978).
213. See note 39 (listing various state and federal acts that provide for compensation); High-
way Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (providing for compensation for re-
moval of outdoor advertising signs). See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978) (discussed in notes 167-74), in which New York City's landmark preservation law in-
cluded a Development Rights Transfer scheme to mitigate the impact on affected landowners.
214. See Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1275-76 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See generally
Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (cited in note 21).
215. See note 188 and accompanying text.
216. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (stating that "government may execute laws or
programs that adversely affect recognized economic values").
217. Id. at 125.
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limitation and must yield to the police power."218 Justice Holmes noted
that government could not function if it had to compensate landowners
for every diminution of "values incident to property."2 19 For example,
when a state constructs a thoroughfare that diverts traffic, its actions
may diminish commercial values incident to land located along the old
roads. Nevertheless, the owners are not entitled to compensation. Simi-
larly, if a city builds a fire station on the location of a former public
park, the change in use does not amount to a taking of an adjacent
landowner's property.220 This is true even if the government's action on
public property decreases the value of the abutting land because no pri-
vate right is infringed. The Constitution does not protect value alone
from government action.221 Values, however, are not rights. In each of
these examples the government action impacts the value of land but
not the rights of the landowners. By contrast, when government regula-
tions affect property values by directly infringing on the rights of the
landowner, greater scrutiny should be given to the infringements. Nev-
ertheless, courts usually refuse to apply such heightened scrutiny unless
regulation takes all beneficial use in property.222
Certain harmful and noxious uses of land that are akin to public
nuisances or other unlawful uses also are not part of a landowner's ti-
tle.223 Indeed, the state may require the destruction of property that
poses an immediate threat to the safety or property of the community
without paying compensation.224 In order to determine which uses are
not part of an owner's title, the Lucas Court held that a court must
examine the "background principles" of a state's property and nuisance
law.225 When the proscribed use similarly would be unlawful under the
state's law of property and nuisance, such use would not inhere in the
title itself. The owner, therefore, would have no right or expectation to
such use. Thus, the government has no obligation to compensate an
owner for prohibiting the use, even if the regulation eliminates the
value of the owner's remaining property.
226
218. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 403 (emphasis added).
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1932).
221. Id. at 319 (stating that "the existence of value alone does not generate interests pro-
tected by the Constitution against diminution by the government, however unreasonable its action
may be").
222. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
223. See note 205 and accompanying text.
224. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-81 (1928).
225. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02. But see Miller, 276 U.S. at 280 (stating, "We need not
weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars [trees] constitute a nuisance according
to the common law; or whether they may be so declared by statute.").
226. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. Lucas recites two examples of landowners who would not be
entitled to compensation for the effects of restrictions: an owner of a lake bed if denied a permit to
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By contrast, when "background principles" of state property and
nuisance law do not make a use unlawful, the landowner's other inter-
ests should be protected from regulatory takings,227 especially when the
restriction deprives these property interests of their value.228 The ex-
tent of protection for these individual interests depends on the degree
of protection and recognition given to such interests under the particu-
lar state's law.2 To demonstrate that "background principles" actually
would prevent the proscribed use, a state cannot merely proffer that the
challenged uses are inconsistent with the public welfare;230 the state
must identify the specific background principles of property and nui-
sance law that would prohibit the use under the given circumstances.231
This requirement is intended to protect landowners' reasonable expec-
tations from the natural and gradual encroachment foreseen by Justice
Holmes in Mahon. 82 The Lucas rule attempts to give force to the oft-
cited holding that the "State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private
property into public property without compensation .... 233
Thus, Lucas currently provides the launch pad for regulatory tak-
ings analysis. Mere value alone and uses that constitute a nuisance 234
clearly stand outside the scope of protectible interests as denominator
property. All other interests remain open for consideration. If the
Court's protectionist trend toward property continues, footnote seven in
Lucas2s5 potentially, could revive the viability of the Just Compensation
Clause for owners. " Footnotes often are overlooked as a source of
change.
fill property when filling would flood others' land or an owner of a nuclear power plant if directed
to cease operations and remove hazardous material after discovery of an earthquake fault near the
plant's location. Id.
227. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (stating that "[tihe
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess").
228. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901 (stating that "common-law principles.., rarely support prohi-
bition of the 'essential use' of land" (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911))).
229. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
230. Id. at 2901.
231. Id. at 2901-02.
232. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. See text accompanying note 6.
233. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980).
234. Whether this must be a common-law nuisance or merely a "noxious use" will depend on
the approach adopted by the Court in future cases.
235. See note 188.
236. For example, footnote four in United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4




B. Rights of Ownership as Denominator Property
Property in the Fifth Amendment is not merely the physical thing
upon which a person exercises her legal rights; rather, "property" for
Fifth Amendment purposes consists of the group of rights inherent to
the owner's relation to the physical thing.37 In United States v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.,238 the Supreme Court stated that a physical concep-
tion is "vulgar and untechnical. 22 9 The Court held that the Fifth
Amendment protects an individual's interest in a thing and not the
thing itself.2 40 Thus, certain rights of ownership may stand alone as
"property" in the deprivation fraction. Although commentators and
courts differ on the degree of protection offered to various property
rights, three property rights are recognized and protected with consis-
tency.241 These are the right to dispose, the right to use, and the right
to possess and exclude.242 Although certain courts already protect these
rights as a per se taking if totally destroyed,43 greater certainty in the
area would exist if the Supreme Court clarified and gave categorical
protection to such rights.
The rights overlap in their effect on the parcel's value. Each right
alone, if totally destroyed, necessarily deprives the property of all or
substantially all of its economic value. The precise deprivation in value
of the entire bundle need not be examined in each case to prove this
point. Certain commentators have observed that various rights would
rise with time to a level of categorical protection through the process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion.244 Thus, although only the three rights
237. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 377.
240. Id. at 378.
241. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain 58-62 (Harvard U., 1985) (commenting that the three traditional rights of ownership are
possession, use, and disposition).
242. See note 84 and accompanying text.
243. See, for example, Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059,
1067 (1989) (stating that "the permanent abrogation of one of those [three] rights, without regard
to its comparative value in relation to the whole, may well be sufficient to constitute a taking");
Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash.2d 1, 829 P.2d 765, 771 (1992) (stating that the "court
also asks if the regulation destroys one or more of the fundamental attributes of property owner-
ship-the right to possess, to exclude others, and to dispose of property").
244. See Sackman and Rohan, 2 Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain § 6.01[1] at 6-15
(cited in note 53):
Constitutional rights rest on substance, not on form, and the liability to pay compensation for
property taken cannot be evaded by leaving the title in the owner, while depriving him of the
beneficial use of the property. ... However, just how severe the interference with the owner's
enjoyment of his property must be to constitute a taking... is not a question which can be
answered in such a way as to furnish a concise rule readily applicable to all cases likely to
arise. Each case must be decided on its own merits until, by the gradual process of judicial
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previously noted are recognized and protected to a significant degree,
'others may arise depending on their level of recognition and protection
under the common law of the several states.245
Recognizing this general proposition, however, certain qualifica-
tions must be made regarding when courts should extend categorical
treatment. First, courts must clarify the nature and basis of protection
for each right. Court opinions currently alternate between a prerequi-
site diminution of "all use" and "all economically viable use" when us-
ing the diminution in value test.246  The proper boundary is
"economically viable use," because some residual use of de minimus
value usually will remain. Some courts unfortunately fail to recognize
the requirement of "economically viable use" and point to remaining
worthless uses to avoid the finding of a total deprivation of value.4 7
Such trivial nit-picking leads to greater uncertainty in takings analysis
instead of a coherent legal framework. Moreover, its arbitrary usage un-
dermines the average citizen's respect for the law. The "economically
viable" standard, although not explicit in cases to date, also should de-
termine whether the destruction of other rights is complete.
1. The Right to Economically Viable Disposition
The right to dispose of one's property, like the right to use, con-
tains both valuable and worthless elements. For example, the right to
sell one's property embodies an extremely valuable right and is the sole
source of profits for many owners. Without this right, an owner could
not realize a gain on his investment when the market rises. By contrast,
the right to give away or donate one's property, although part of the
right to dispose, represents a de minimus value. The right to sell, rather
exclusion and inclusion, it is possible to say which side of the line any given injury to pri-
vate property rights may be said to fall.
In a general way, however, it may be said that when an interference with the use and
enjoyment of land that would be actionable at common law is effected under legal authority
and as an incident to the construction of a public improvement.., or of an injury of such a
character as substantially to oust the owner from the possession of the land and to deprive
him of all beneficial use thereof, there is a taking of property in the constitutional sense,
whether there has been any formal condemnation or not.
Id. (emphasis added).
245. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7; General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 377-78.
246. The government often cites trivial "uses" to attempt to show remaining value in a par-
cel. Whether these uses will prevent a total diminution in value for Fifth Amendment purposes
will depend upon the attitude of the court. See, for example, Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2919 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (contending that fishing, camping, or selling land to a neighbor as a buffer make prop-
erty "far from 'valueless'" and arguing that uses such as bird watching and sunbathing are "of
value" to the owner). But see Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 158 (Cl. Ct.
1990) (rejecting hunting, bird watching, and growing salt hay as valuable uses in an eminent do-
main case).
247. See discussion in note 246.
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than the general right to dispose, therefore forms the fundamental core
of the protectible "property." Therefore, the destruction of the right to
sell should give rise to a compensable taking, regardless of the fact that
de minimus disposition rights remain. Andrus v. Allard,4 8 in which a
statute prohibited the sale of certain feathers, may appear to contradict
this view, but Andrus should be distinguished as a personal property
case rather than a real property case. Personal property does not carry
the same expectations of ownership as land, and therefore is provided
lesser protection.24 '9 The Court in Hodel v. Irving25 ° established the bet-
ter view for real property when it stated that the right to sell real prop-
erty interests should be compensable per se when totally destroyed.
Although the physical property is not totally deprived of value, the
Court should find the deprivation of all economically viable disposition
rights sufficient to constitute a taking. A categorical classification would
bring certainty to this area and provide delineated boundaries for both
government planners and property owners. Property owners could in-
vest in land with the certainty that their right to dispose would not be
impaired. When designing regulations, planners would have greater in-
centives to avoid their Hobbesian tendency to intrude into this sacred
ground. Moreover, utmost discretion by the judiciary need not be
granted for this rule because planners and regulators still could cross
this line whenever necessary by providing for just compensation. The
government's ability to act and to regulate is limited, therefore, only in
fiscal terms, forcing it to use "the constitutional way" of taxation to pay
for this type of change.
2. The Right of Economically Viable Possession and Exclusion
The rights of possession and exclusion are not fundamental prop-
erty rights because of their inherent value alone; rather, their role in
protecting an owner's privacy interest raises the rights to a higher do-
main. The Court's holdings do not explicitly separate the economic and
privacy interests in these rights, but both interests underlie the Court's
seemingly inconsistent results. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins,25 the owner voluntarily opened his property to the public for shop-
ping purposes. His privacy interest therefore did not pose the same
concern to the Court as would a private residence. Moreover, the
Court's compelled toleration of political petition gathering did not un-
248. See notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
249. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-900.
250. See notes 112-14 and accompanying text. But see McAndrews v. New Bank of New
England, 796 F. Supp. 613 (D. Mass. 1992) (finding no taking when a statute deprived the plaintiff
only of his right to terminate a lease with an insolvent bank).
251. See notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
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reasonably impair the value or economic use of the property. Under
such circumstances, one could redefine the Court's holding in diminu-
tion terms to state that the compelled temporary intrusions infringed
upon only de minimus elements of the right to exclude, not the right as
a whole. The economically viable elements of the right to exclude re-
mained unscathed. Thus, even under a diminution equation, no taking
would occur and the balancing test would reinforce the result.
By contrast, the right to exclude in all residential and most com-
mercial contexts should receive categorical protection. The infringe-
ment of this right in these contexts would destroy a right that protects
the economic viability of the property for such uses. Thus, results under
a diminution in value test and a narrow definition of denominator prop-
erty as the right of economically viable possession would remain consis-
tent with the current Court's holdings. Explicitly raising this right to
per se protection status would add certainty to the law without interfer-
ing with the government's ability to "go on."
3. The Right of Economically Viable Use
The right to use for purposes as a denominator in the diminution
in value test is more accurately framed as the right to economically via-
ble use. Courts should find a total deprivation of this right whenever a
restriction prevents owners from either making any improvements on
their land or receiving reasonable rents from their investment. De mini-
mus uses such as bird watching, camping, and the like should not con-
stitute sufficient uses to prevent a finding of a total taking when no
other economic uses remain.
More difficult issues arise when the right of use in property is di-
vided, such as by easements or licenses, or sold or devised to separate
owners. Courts are split on whether such division creates independent
"property" for the purpose of serving as the denominator in the depri-
vation fraction. A number of Supreme Court holdings, including Key-
stone and Penn Central, suggest that courts must look at a regulation's
effect on the parcel as a whole, rather than its effect on individual inter-
ests in the land. In Keystone, the Court refused to define the claimant's
"property" for diminution analysis separately as a support estate and a
mineral estate, although Pennsylvania common law recognized and pro-
tected each of these. The Keystone Court reasserted that takings analy-
sis should not subdivide single parcels in order to find the rights of one
of the smaller parcels totally abrogated.252 Instead, the Court chose to
focus on the diminution in the rights of the "parcel as a whole. ' 253 The
252. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31).
253. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497.
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opinion represents a division of the physical property interests (the sur-
face, mineral, and support estates) still layered with all of the funda-
mental rights; the opinion does not explain how to treat the rights
individually across the physical spectrum. Moreover, the opinion only
states that courts should not separate the unity of property held by one
owner to determine the denominator;25 4 the opinion does not address
the appropriate takings analysis when an owner, rather than a court,
divides the property into discrete segments of rights among numerous
owners. In this circumstance, a claimant's aggregate bundle would be
only one right. Nevertheless, some courts interpret Keystone to require
the consideration of the underlying parcel along with any intangible in-
terest severed from that parcel when assessing the degree of diminution
to the owner of that single severed interest.
255
By contrast, other Supreme Court holdings appear to suggest that
individual, intangible property interests should be protected separately
under the diminution in value test, and Lucas clearly leaves this pro-
position open. 58 In United States v. General Motors Corp.,57 the
Court observed that government action might amount to a taking if its
effects "deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject
matter .... 2Is The Court deliberately chose the wording "his interest"
rather than "all interests" to ensure that a claimant with a tenancy for
years rather than a fee simple would still recover his lesser interest.
Moreover, the Court broadly held that the takings clause includes every
type of property interest that a citizen may possess.259 Although the
case concerned an eminent domain proceeding by the government and a
temporal division of fundamental property rights, the Court recognized
that government action other than acquisition of title and occupancy
can amount to a taking. The holding, therefore, also should apply to
regulatory takings of citizens' other interests.
Liens that are valid under state law, although not a complete "bun-
dle" of rights in property, have received protection as denominator
property. In Armstrong v. United States,260 the Court found that the
254. Id.
255. See, for example, Grand Forks-Trail Water Users, Inc. v. Hjelle, 413 N.W.2d 344 (N.D.
1987). The state used a restriction on construction within 100 feet of the highway center line to
reduce the costs of possible future highway expansion. Id. at 345-47. The claimant purchased a
utility easement within 100 feet of the line and used it for over 10 years before the state purchased
the additional right of way and suffered pipe relocation costs to avoid damage. Id. at 345.
256. See discussion in note 20.
257. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
258. Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
259. Id. The Court specifically stated that the "constitutional provision is addressed to every
sort of interest the citizen may possess." Id.
260. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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government's destruction of a materialman's lien in certain property
amounted to a compensable taking.21 The Court observed that the to-
tal destruction of this interest was compensable because it was not a
mere consequence of a legitimate regulatory action. 62 The Fifth
Amendment's sole concern with the owner's relation to the physical
thing reinforces this interpretation. 68 If an owner's relation is only with
one fundamental real property right, then the denominator should not
consist of more than that right. Accordingly, when an owner holds a
compensable property interest before a regulation, fairness dictates that
a compensable taking should occur if a regulation eliminates that
interest.
C. Temporal and Spatial Views of Denominator Property
The issue of how to define denominator property in temporal and
spatial terms presents additional problems for the diminution in value
test. This Author does not pretend to solve with one brush of the pen a
riddle that has frustrated courts for over seventy years. This Note
presents the most common questions and contexts on the takings issue
and considers the effect of per se treatment for narrow protection.
1. Temporal Views of Denominator Property
a. Property Disposed of Before the Time of Taking
An owner may purchase a parcel and subsequently sell part of that
parcel. An issue arises, therefore, concerning whether contiguous prop-
erty disposed of before the time of the alleged taking should be consid-
ered as part of the denominator "parcel as a whole" for diminution
analysis.
Keystone264 provides some guidance on whether to consider all
property included in the original purchase as part of the "parcel as a
whole." In Keystone, the Court defined the value of the parcels as a
whole as that remaining in the property when the alleged taking oc-
curred. 265 The Court examined the value of all remaining coal at the
time of the alleged taking as the whole..26 This analysis did not include
property held at the time of the original purchase but disposed of
before the alleged taking. The Claims Court has followed this method
261. Id. at 48-49.
262. Id.
263. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 378.
264. See notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
265. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).
266. Id. at 497-98.
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in a number of cases, and this approach appears to be the prevailing
view. Thus, the value of property held just before the time of the al-
leged taking should serve as the denominator, and the value of the same
property held just after the alleged taking should constitute the numer-
ator of the deprivation fraction.
b. Market Value Versus Basis of an Owner's Investment
Whether an owner's investment basis or the fair market value of
the property just before the alleged taking constitutes the denominator
remains an open issue for some courts. Without a set formula for tak-
ings analysis, certain courts have indicated that it may be proper to
compare the owner's investment or basis with the post-taking market
value of the property to determine the regulation's effect on the
owner. 68 Although the owner's basis is relevant in exercising a value
judgment,269 it should not be relevant in determining whether a total
diminution has occurred. The diminution test demonstrates a regula-
tion's effect on the owner's relation to his property. An owner with a
loss in fair market value prior to a regulation cannot use such a loss to
claim a total taking; the market, rather than the regulation, deprives
him of such value. Similarly, the government cannot deny that a depri-
vation occurs because only extraordinary gains were destroyed. This
could occur, for example, when property has been held for many years
and has a very low basis. In order to depict accurately the regulation's
effect on ownership, the fair market value just prior to the alleged tak-
ing, not an owner's basis, should be used to determine the denominator.
2. Spatial Views of Denominator Property
The most problematic determination remains the spatial definition
of which property should be included after establishing the time of
ownership.
a. Non-Contiguous Property
A regulation that deprives an owner of all economic value on one
parcel may not deprive this owner of values in other land in the same
area. An issue arises, then, concerning whether an owner's non-contigu-
267. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 392 (1988); Formanek v.
United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992) (excluding portions of property sold before the date of the
Corps of Engineers' permit denial).





ous property in the same area should be considered as part of the de-
nominator's "parcel as a whole" for the diminution in value test.
Physically non-contiguous or non-adjacent property owned by the
same property owner generally has not been included in the denomina-
tor as part of the "whole." In Penn Central Transportation Co., the
Supreme Court defined the "parcel" to include only that property sub-
ject to the landmark designation.270 Although the plaintiff owned other
properties throughout the city, the Court excluded the non-contiguous
properties from the denominator of the deprivation fraction. A number
of other courts have followed this pattern when the regulatory act did
not affect the excluded non-contiguous properties.
271
Other eminent domain cases, however, have ignored these holdings
and have included property far beyond the physical parcel affected. In
Ciampitti v. United States272 the Claims Court included non-contigu-
ous properties held by the plaintiff in the deprivation fraction's denom-
inator. The court based its decision on the claimant's treatment of both
properties as a single parcel for purchasing and financing purposes.
273
The court reasoned that it would be inappropriate to permit the claim-
ant to "sever" the connection for takings analysis because the claimant
"forged" the connection for financing purposes.274 The court also ob-
served that the plaintiff retained ownership of certain lots in between
the properties eventually acquired. 5
This reasoning indicates the potential for expansive abuse in defin-
ing Fifth Amendment property as long as the Supreme Court refuses to
define the relevant property and does not consider whether the tracts
were used for a single integrated use.2 76 This particularly broad view
may cause developers to make inefficient separations of properties for
financing purposes. Moreover, courts should proceed with great caution
when unifying non-contiguous properties. Broadening the view of
"property" to include non-contiguous properties carries with it substan-
tial "demoralization costs" to current and potential oWners. 77 Demoral-
270. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 114-15, 130-31.
271. See, for example, Am. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Marin County, 653 F.2d 364, 369-70 (9th
Cir. 1981); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988). In Loveladies Harbor,
the court excluded parcels that were part of the plaintiff's original purchase but no longer contigu-
ous to the property allegedly taken and were not affected by the Corps' permit denial. Id. at 391-
93.
272. 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991).
273. Id. at 320.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See discussion in note 68.
277. See Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1214 (cited in note 21). Similarly, Judge Friendly
implicitly recognized this demoralization cost when pointing out the need for uniformity between
federal and state condemnations of property. In United States v. Certain Property Located in the
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ization causes property owners to avoid productive risk-taking in
enterprises, undermining the basis of our economic system. 8 Including
only the owner's financing arrangements, without more, could lead tak-
ings analysis into another abyss of subjectivity. Courts must avoid sub-
jectivity in order to produce a functional definition of denominator
property for use by government planners and private investors.
b. Contiguous Property
One of the most problematic issues in this area is the consideration
of an owner's contiguous property as part of the parcel as a whole.
Property owners often own adjacent parcels. Sometimes the parcels are
purchased at the same time; sometimes they are puchased at different
times. In either case, the properties also may be listed under separate
titles and different tax numbers. Whether this makes the interests dif-
ferent for purposes of "legal protection and recognition," as discussed
in Lucas,2 79 remains an open question.
The "rule of joinder" concept used in condemnation proceedings
provides one set of analogous considerations for determining diminu-
tion.280 This issue arises when the state formally condemns a particular
parcel of land. If the individual owns property adjacent to that con-
demned, the owner may be entitled to compensation for the effects on
the adjacent property. 81 Compensation for diminution on the adjacent
but prima facie distinct parcel depends upop its "unity" with the af-
fected parcel. The "unity of property" among these parcels generally
requires a unity of title, contiguity of use, and unity of use.2 8  The
greatest emphasis usually is placed on the unity of use.283 The unity of
use concept applies to non-contiguous properties as well, but the circuit
courts disagree over the proper standard for determining what use is
Borough of Manhattan, 344 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965), Judge Friendly noted that the convenience of
the federal government was trivial when compared with the "need for New York business men
planning to invest in trade fixtures to know that what is real property on Broadway if the city or
state condemns it, will be no less real property if taken instead by the federal government." Id. at
144-45.
278. Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1214 (cited in note 21).
279. 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
280. Sackman and Rohan, 4 Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain § 12.02[1] at 12-76 to 12-
77 (cited in note 53) (concerning property "substantially identical" in ownership and used or
foreseeably used as an "integrated economic unit").
281. Id.
282. See, for example, Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 391, 395 (1st Cir. 1944) (stating
that "[clontiguous tracts may be 'separate' ones if used separately .. and tracts physically sepa-
rated from one another may constitute a 'single' tract if put to an integrated unitary use");
Sauvageau v. Hjelle, 213 N.W.2d 381, 388-89 (N.D. 1973).
283. Baetjer, 143 F.2d at 395.
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sufficient to constitute unity."4 The potential ambiguity in this area
therefore limits the effectiveness of the concept as a doctrinal tool. Ac-
cordingly, the focus should be centered only on the doctrine's use for
contiguous parcels.
The unity of use concept, if used for regulatory takings analysis,
would avoid unifying properties for diminution evaluation when objec-
tive uses clearly demonstrate that the properties are distinct invest-
ments. For example, when an owner possesses contiguous properties for
two distinct uses, such as an apartment complex and a gas station, the
contiguous properties should not be treated as two "segments" of the
parcel as a whole. Rather, the properties should be considered separate
entities for compensation purposes. This approach would comport with
the owner's "distinct investment-backed expectations," a factor consid-
ered relevant in defining property.285 This approach also would permit
courts to presume that contiguous properties are held for an integrated
use.
The "legal protection and recognition" distinction proposed in Lu-
cas286 suggests another potential distinction. When parcels are held by
an owner, but the state records two parcels as separate tracts of land
and grants separate tax identification numbers to each property, the
state's legal recognition of the two parcels as distinct for such purposes
also could be held sufficient for diminution analysis. Under this ap-
proach, the state would control the division of property for takings
analysis through the same avenues that it taxes and grants recognition
of ownership. Landowners could reasonably expect that such state rec-
ognition affords them a distinct and protectible right in each parcel.
Government planners would have objective data when defining the
scope of regulations. No additional inquiries or piercing of corporate
veils would be necessary; owners would not need to play hiding games.
When partnerships consisting of some, but not all, of the same partners
develop contiguous properties, this approach would avoid the potential
problem of determining whether contiguous lots are "owned" by the
same claimant. The state would incur no greater burden than if all the
properties were owned by different individuals. Owners would not have
to avoid contiguous ownership to reduce the risk of new regulation.
These two approaches offer greater certainty and fairness to the
regulatory takings area. The unity concept would permit merger when
an integrated use provided objective data of the owner's expectations.
284. Compare Baetjer, 143 F.2d at 395, with United States v. Mattox, 375 F.2d 461, 463 (4th
Cir. 1967).
285. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
286. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
1326 [Vol. 46:1283
FIFTH AMENDMENT "PROPERTY"1
Integrated use could be presumed if courts decided to place greater
burdens on the owner. If integrated use were not presumed, undevel-
oped land purchased as separate tracts would be protected individually.
Similar protection for an owner would exist if the alternative approach
of recording statutes and tax identification were used to distinguish
parcels as a whole. Either approach would improve the clarity of de-
nominator property.
As a final caveat to this discussion, it should be noted that courts
have already recognized one exception to the general contiguous prop-
erty rule when an owner purchases contiguous property without any an-
ticipated economically viable use. A number of courts have held that
when a claimant purchases contiguous property along with property
later affected by regulation, and the properties were not expected to be
viable for use, such property should not be included as part of the par-
cel as a whole for diminution analysis.28 7 This would occur, for example,
when a claimant purchased property that previously had been denied
permits for construction or other improvements.2 8 s The courts reasoned
that because the owners did not have an expectation of viable use for
their properties, the owners did not consider the property part of the
whole. 29 Therefore, the property should not be included as part of the
whole after the enactment of new regulations.
D. Mineral and Surface Estates as Denominator Property
The common law of most states recognizes and protects two estates
in land: the surface estate and the mineral estate.2 90 Estates in land
differ from easements and licenses because estates embody all three
fundamental property rights, whereas easements and licenses are non-
possessory interests s.29 The owner of an easement or license may not
subdivide her interests to other parties. 92 By contrast, estates may be
subdivided by their owners. Estates, therefore, are afforded greater pro-
tection by the courts.
287. See, for example, Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 791 F.2d at 904-05; Loveladies Harbor, Inc.,
15 Cl. Ct. at 391-93.
288. Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 15 Cl. Ct. at 393.
289. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 791 F.2d at 904-05; Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 15 Cl. Ct. at 391-
93.
290. This is in contrast to Pennsylvania, which also recognizes a support estate.
291. See Cunningham, Stoebuck, and Whitman, The Law of Property § 8.1 at 435 (cited in
note 84) (noting that when an easement or profit is carved from a possessory estate, "[s]ome of the
sticks have been taken from the bundle that comprise the estate and have been transferred to the
holder of the easement or profit").
292. Id. See also A. James Casner, ed., 2 American Law of Property §§ 8.1-8.108 at 227-314
(Little, Brown, 1952) (noting that an easement is a limit on the possessory right of a land owner).
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In both Mahon and Keystone, the Court considered the mineral
estate distinct from the surface estate when determining the diminution
of the claimants' property."'8 The Court did not subdivide the coal it-
self into segments.294 The principal incongruity in these cases concerned
the support estate, a unique estate recognized in only a few states. The
Court in Mahon arguably treated the estate as separate for diminution
purposes, held its taking to be whole, and denied the owner of the sur-
face estate protection under the challenged Pennsylvania statute. 95 To
the dismay of the four dissenting justices in Keystone,9 6 the majority
refused to view the damage to the support estate as complete, even
though all "economically viable" strands-the right to cause damage to
the surface-had been destroyed.2 97 Moreover, the Court refused to
view the support estate as a distinct estate with the same protections as
the mineral or surface estates.29 a Although Pennsylvania common law
recognized the estates as equal and independent, the Court viewed the
estate "in practical terms" and observed that its value exists only inso-
far as it attaches to another estate.2 99 The dissent disagreed, and the
Lucas decision indicates that the debate is not yet over.
Estates also present a number of difficult issues when examining
the restriction of their use under the diminution in value test. Although
Keystone established their independence when owned separately, the
case did not consider how estates should be addressed when held by the
same person. For example, suppose an owner learns of a large oil re-
serve beneath his property. The surface, however, is located on the out-
skirts of an expanding metropolis. The owner sells a fifty percent
mineral interest to an oil company. Before drilling commences, the city
passes an ordinance prohibiting all drilling activities within city limits
for the stated purpose of protecting the general welfare. The ordinance
completely destroys all economically viable use of the mineral estate.
Does such an act amount to a taking, and should it matter whether or
not the surface estate owner also owns the mineral estate? The frame-
work of takings jurisprudence determines how both the owners and the
planners will approach this act.
The government planner could approach the issue along two princi-
pal avenues. First, the planner should consider whether the recovery of
293. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498-99.
294. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498-99.
295. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414 (recognizing the support estate to be "a very valuable estate").
296. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia dissented. Keystone,
480 U.S. at 506.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 499-501.
299. Id. at 501.
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the oil, through drilling or other methods, amounts to a common-law
nuisance under the state's law or is a noxious use. If the use would
amount to a common-law nuisance, the planner may look to Lucas as
support for the regulation and put her pen to rest. She would not need
to consider the second issue of whether there was a complete depriva-
tion. If the use is merely a noxious use, Hadacheck and other cases may
apply,30 0 but the higher standard raised by Lucas may become the pre-
vailing view. Most regulation of such activities will find common-law
support for enjoining the use, especially when the proscribed use is not
already underway. 0 1
Nevertheless, suppose the company already began its oil recovery
operations and had a well on-site before the ordinance is passed. Fur-
ther suppose that the ban on the operation of oil wells could not be
justified under the common-law doctrine of nuisance or as a noxious
use. If the ordinance calls for an immediate end to all oil recovery oper-
ations, it still would destroy all value. As discussed earlier, the diminu-
tion test should compare the value of the property remaining just
before the alleged taking with the value of the property afterwards.
Thus, the oil already recovered would not be considered part of the par-
cel as a whole. The planner's dilemma then becomes how to ensure ei-
ther that a total taking has not occurred or to provide for just
compensation.
If the mineral and surface estates are considered together, the dim-
inution clearly would not be complete. The use of the surface estate
would remain. The oil company, however, clearly would lose its entire
interest in the land. Ignoring its loss would not protect its ownership,
which is viewed more properly in its relationship with the single estate.
It would be difficult to argue that the oil company's interest is of lesser
interest than that of the owner of a lease, who would be protected even
though the entire fee simple was not taken. Indeed, the mineral estate
often is many times more valuable than the surface estate, and in such
circumstances always greater than the value of the lease. In this circum-
stance, too, it would be inequitable to provide compensation for only
the company and not the owner of the surface estate, because both par-
ties own an equal interest in the mineral estate.
300. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), the Court refused to "preclude devel-
opment and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions." Id. at 410. The Court rationalized its
holding on the belief that "[t]here must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in the
way they must yield to the good of the community." Id. The Court overlooked the fact that pro-
gress could proceed alternatively along the road of taxation and formal condemnation.
301. Even if the use has been conducted for a long time, and the use is not a nuisance per se,




In addition to failing to protect otherwise legally protectible rights,
failure to consider the mineral estate separate from the surface estate
produces the demoralization costs discussed by Professor Michelman. °2
Owners of surface estates would not receive protection, although com-
panies that acquire only a mineral interest would be protected. More-
over, companies could not acquire surface estates without adding the
risk of being unprotected.
The approaches suggested for treatment of contiguous properties
could apply to different estates owned by the same entity. Under a
unity of use theory, merger of the estates may or may not be presumed.
If, however, the owner of the surface estate also conducts the mineral
recovery operations, a unity of use would exist. Problems with this ap-
proach are clear. For example, separate partnerships could be formed to
avoid unity of ownership. Under a record and taxation theory, the es-
tates would achieve a clear distinction only insofar as the state permits
such recognition.
In sum, mineral estates and surface estates owned by separate par-
ties clearly should constitute independent denominator property ac-
cording to either Mahon or Keystone. Whether other estates will
receive such treatment will depend on the approaches adopted after
Lucas. When a single party owns more than one estate in the same par-
cel, the estates should be treated as separate denominator properties
according to their recognition under state law. The unity of use theory
potentially applicable to contiguous properties presents problems of
private abuse and market disruption. A record and taxation approach
appears more objective and less likely to result in private abuse, be-
cause protection would be controlled by the actions of the state. In ei-
ther case, a narrower protection of the denominator would provide
greater clarity for both private investors and state regulators without
placing an undue burden on government.
V. CONCLUSION
The greatest problem caused by the current muddle of takings ju-
risprudence in today's regulatory climate is neither its potential burden
on landowners nor its interference with proper government activities.
Rather, the problem is its uncertainty to owners and to planners and
regulators. For owners, the uncertainty rests in whether their invest-
ment and privacy interests in land will be protected. For planners and
regulators, the uncertainty lies in whether particular social and environ-
mental regulations require compensation. A narrow and clear definition
of particular units of relevant property would provide a set of identifi-
302. See notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
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able situations when the burden on individuals is too great to pass
without compensation.
The certainty derived from a per se model would protect an
owner's investment-backed expectations and assist government plan-
ning decisions.03 A stronger per se model would not prevent govern-
ment planners from enacting a regulatory scheme; rather, a stronger per
se model would force planners to consider the compensation issue seri-
ously. As discussed earlier, unelected officials whose offices are not di-
rectly scrutinized by a public vote create and administer regulations.
Accordingly, their actions are insulated more than those of elected offi-
cials. A stronger per se model would force government planners to ob-
serve clearly defined metes and bounds of property interests. If they
decide that an invasion is necessary, adequate compensation rather
than artful schemes of compelling reasons should occupy their minds.
The current model provides no such incentives. The abolition of the
harm-preventing and benefit-conferring distinction in Lucas will reduce
the semantics to some degree, but the balancing test still encourages
legislators to create fictional state interests to justify dubious means.
Under the diminution in value test, a precise definition eliminates
much of the subjectivity in determining what percent of a taking must
occur in the larger unit of property by delineating and protecting spe-
cific valuable and important property interests. Although discretion is
reduced by per se rules in this area, other prongs such as the nuisance
test remain in order to protect the state's interest in regulating certain
externalities caused by land use. At the same time, a narrow definition
of Fifth Amendment property interests balances this broad scope of the
government's police power. A narrow definition of Fifth Amendment
"property" protects the interests of the property owner, thereby forcing
the primary focus to the issue of just compensation, the least subjective
of the final prongs. Flexibility for government action still exists because
a taking does not prohibit government action. Unlike due process
claims, the takings claimant should recover only just compensation, not
an injunction of the government's regulatory taking.30 4
Three distinct property rights already stand as readily protectible
in the background of current Supreme Court case law. Estates in land
303. By contrast, some commentators such as Dean John Costonis view the expectations of
property owners as a fluid concept depending upon the politics and ideology of the age. Costonis,
58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 527 (cited in note 52) (stating that "each age must address the takings issue
anew because perceptions of use-dependancy, like those of the concept of property itself, are
closely bound up with the age's overall political and social currents"). Nevertheless, even Dean
Costonis acknowledges that a consistent application of some coherent method is necessary to
maintain the integrity of individual takings decisions. Id. at 524.
304. See discussion in note 168.
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also present interests already recognized and protected in many states.
Narrow protection in a per se analysis should extend to these interests
regardless of whether the owner also owns other estates in the same
land. Rules applicable to treatment of contiguous property may be used
to determine circumstances when estates and parcels may be unified or
separated for diminution analysis. The treatment of property in sepa-
rate legal spheres such as recording and taxation may give rise to expec-
tations of independent segments as well. Therefore, courts should
respect such expectations when defining the common denominator.
With a per se takings model presented by the most recent Supreme
Court takings case, other courts should adopt narrower models of Fifth
Amendment property to provide greater certainty to takings
jurisprudence.
David C. Buck*
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